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Because there are many potential risks in the MR envi-
ronment and reports of adverse incidents involving
patients, equipment and personnel, the need for a guid-
ance document on MR safe practices emerged. Initially
published in 2002, the ACR MR Safe Practices Guidelines
established de facto industry standards for safe and
responsible practices in clinical and research MR environ-
ments. As the MR industry changes the document is
reviewed, modified and updated. The most recent version
will reflect these changes.
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THERE ARE POTENTIAL risks in the MR environ-
ment, not only for the patient (1,2) but also for the
accompanying family members, attending health care
professionals, and others who find themselves only
occasionally or rarely in the magnetic fields of MR
scanners, such as security or housekeeping person-
nel, firefighters, police, etc. (3–6). There have been
reports in the medical literature and print-media
detailing Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) adverse
incidents involving patients, equipment and personnel
that spotlighted the need for a safety review by an
expert panel. To this end, the American College of
Radiology originally formed the Blue Ribbon Panel on
MR Safety. First constituted in 2001, the panel was
charged with reviewing existing MR safe practices and
guidelines (5–8) and issuing new ones as appropriate
for MR examinations. Published initially in 2002 (4),
the ACR MR Safe Practice Guidelines established de
facto industry standards for safe and responsible
practices in clinical and research MR environments.
These were subsequently reviewed and updated in
May of 2004 (3). After reviewing substantial feedback
from the field and installed base, as well as changes
that had transpired throughout the MR industry since
the publication of the 2004 version of this document,
the panel extensively reviewed, modified, and updated
the entire document in 2006–2007.
The present panel consists of the following
members: A. James Barkovich, MD, Charlotte Bell,
MD, (American Society of Anesthesiologists), James P.
Borgstede, MD, FACR, William G. Bradley, MD, PhD,
FACR, Jerry W. Froelich, MD, FACR, J. Rod Gimbel,
MD, FACC, Cardiologist, John Gosbee, MD, MS, Ellisa
Kuhni-Kaminski, RT (R)(MR), Emanuel Kanal, MD,
FACR, FISMRM (chair), James W. Lester Jr., MD,
John Nyenhuis, PhD, Daniel Joe Schaefer, PhD Engi-
neer, Elizabeth A. Sebek, RN, BSN, CRN, Jeffrey
Weinreb, MD, Terry Woods, PhD, FDA, Pamela Wilcox,
RN, MBA (ACR Staff), Leonard Lucey, JD, LLM (ACR
Staff), and Dina Hernandez, RT (R) (CT) (QM) (ACR
Staff). The following represents the most recently
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modified and updated version of the combined prior
three reports (3,4,9) issued by the American College of
Radiology Blue Ribbon Panel on MR Safety, chaired by
Emanuel Kanal, MD, FACR. It is important to note that
nothing that appears herein is the result of a ‘‘majority
vote’’ of the member of this panel. As with each prior
publication of these ACR MR Safe Practice Guidelines,
the entire document, from introduction to the mark-
edly expanded appendices, represents the unanimous
consensus of each and every member of this Safety
Committee and the various areas of expertise that they
represent. This includes representation from fields and
backgrounds as diverse as MR physicists, research/
academic radiologists, private practice radiologists, MR
safety experts, patient safety experts/researchers, MR
technologists, MR nursing, National Electrical Manu-
facturers Association, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, the American Society of Anesthesiologists, legal
counsel, and others. Lay personnel, physicians,
Ph.D.s, department chairs and house-staff/residents,
government employees and private practitioners,
doctors, nurses, technologists, radiologists, anesthesi-
ologists, cardiologists, attorneys—these are all
represented on this Committee. It was believed that
achieving unanimity for these Guidelines was critical
to demonstrate to all that these Guidelines are not
only appropriate from a scientific point of view, but
reasonably applicable in the real world in which we all
must live, with all its patient care, financial, and
throughput pressures and considerations. The views
expressed in this study are solely those of the authors
and in no way suggest a policy or position of any of the
organizations represented by the authors.
The following MR safe practice guidelines document
is intended to be used as a template for MR facilities to
follow in the development of an MR safety program.
These guidelines were developed to help guide MR prac-
titioners regarding these issues and to provide a basis
for them to develop and implement their own MR poli-
cies and practices. It is intended that these MR safe
practice guidelines (and the policies and procedures to
which they give rise) be reviewed and updated on a reg-
ular basis as the field of MR safety continues to evolve.
The principles behind these MR Safe Practice
Guidelines are specifically intended to apply not only
to diagnostic settings but also to patient, research
subject, and health care personnel safety for all MRI
settings, including those designed for clinical diagnos-
tic imaging, research, interventional, and intraopera-
tive MR applications.
With the increasing advent and use of 3.0-Tesla and
higher strength magnets, users need to recognize that
one should never assume MR compatibility or safety
information about a device if it is not clearly docu-
mented in writing. Decisions based on published MR
safety and compatibility claims should recognize that
all such claims apply only to specifically tested condi-
tions, such as static magnetic field strengths, static
gradient magnetic field strengths and spatial distribu-
tions, and the strengths and rates of change of gradi-
ent and radiofrequency (RF) magnetic fields.
Finally, there are many issues that impact MR
safety which should be considered during site
planning for a given MR installation. We include in
this manuscript, as separate appendices, sections
that address such issues as well, including cryogen
emergency vent locations and pathways, 5-Gauss
line, siting considerations, patient access pathways,
etc. Yet despite their appearance herein, these issues,
and many others, should be reviewed with those expe-
rienced with MR site planning and familiar with the
patient safety and patient flow considerations before
committing construction to a specific site design. In
this regard, enlisting the assistance of an architec-
tural firm experienced in this area, and doing so early
in the design stages of the planning process, may
prove most valuable.
It remains the intent of the ACR that these MR Safe
Practice Guidelines will prove helpful as the field of
MRI continues to evolve and mature, providing MR
services that are among the most powerful, yet safest,
of all diagnostic procedures to be developed in the
history of modern medicine.
ACR GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON MR SAFE
PRACTICES: 2013
A. Establish, Implement, and Maintain Current
MR Safety Policies and Procedures
1. All clinical and research MR sites, irrespective of
magnet format or field strength, including instal-
lations for diagnostic, research, interventional,
and/or surgical applications, should maintain
MR safety policies.
2. These policies and procedures should also be
reviewed concurrently with the introduction of
any significant changes in safety parameters of
the MR environment of the site (e.g., adding
faster or stronger gradient capabilities or higher
RF duty cycle studies) and updated as needed. In
this review process, national and international
standards and recommendations should be
taken into consideration before establishing local
guidelines, policies, and procedures
3. Each site will name a MR medical director whose
responsibilities will include ensuring that MR
safe practice guidelines are established and
maintained as current and appropriate for the
site. It is the responsibility of the site’s adminis-
tration to ensure that the policies and procedures
that result from these MR safe practice guide-
lines are implemented and adhered to at all times
by all of the site’s personnel.
4. Procedures should be in place to ensure that any
and all adverse events, MR safety incidents, or
‘‘near incidents’’ that occur in the MR site are to
be reported to the medical director in a timely
manner (e.g., within 24 hours or 1 business day
of their occurrence) and used in continuous qual-
ity improvement efforts. It should be stressed
that the Food and Drug Administration states
that it is incumbent upon the sites to also report
adverse events and incidents to them by means
of their Medwatch program. The ACR supports
this requirement and believes that it is in the
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ultimate best interest of all MR practitioners to
create and maintain this consolidated database
of such events to help us all learn about them
and how to better avoid them in the future (10).
B. Static Magnetic Field Issues: Site Access
Restriction
1. Zoning
The MR site is conceptually divided into four Zones
[see Fig. 1 and Appendices 1 and 3]:
a. Zone I: This region includes all areas that are
freely accessible to the general public. This area
is typically outside the MR environment itself
and is the area through which patients, health
care personnel, and other employees of the MR
site access the MR environment.
b. Zone II: This area is the interface between the
publicly accessible, uncontrolled. Zone I and the
strictly controlled Zones III and IV. Typically,
patients are greeted in Zone II and are not free to
move throughout Zone II at will, but are rather
Figure 1. Idealized sample floor
plan illustrates site access restric-
tion considerations. Other MR
potential safety issues, such as
magnet site planning related to
fringe magnetic field considerations,
are not meant to be include herein.
See Appendix 1 for personnel and
zone definitions. Note—In any zone
of the facility, there should be com-
pliance with Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) regulations in regard to pri-
vacy of patient information. How-
ever, in Zone III, there should be a
privacy barrier so that unauthorized
persons cannot view control panels.
Note: In any zone of the facility,
there should be compliance with
HIPAA regulations in regard to pri-
vacy of patient information. How-
ever, in Zone III, there should be a
privacy barrier so that unauthorized
persons cannot view the control
panels. Please note that this dia-
gram is an example intended for
educational, illustration purposes
only. The MR Functional Diagram
was obtained from and modified
with the permission of the ‘‘Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs Office of
Construction & Facilities Manage-
ment, Strategic Management Office’’.
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under the supervision of MR personnel (see
section B.2.b, below). It is in Zone II that the
answers to MR screening questions, patient
histories, medical insurance questions, etc. are
typically obtained.
c. Zone III: This area is the region in which free
access by unscreened non-MR personnel or
ferromagnetic objects or equipment can result in
serious injury or death as a result of interactions
between the individuals or equipment and the
MR scanner’s particular environment. These
interactions include, but are not limited to, those
involving the MR scanner’s static and time-vary-
ing magnetic fields. All access to Zone III is to be
strictly restricted, with access to regions within it
(including Zone IV see below) controlled by, and
entirely under the supervision of, MR personnel
(see Section B.2.b, below). Specifically identified
MR personnel (typically, but not necessarily only,
the MR technologists) are to be charged with
ensuring that this MR safe practice guideline is
strictly adhered to for the safety of the patients
and other non-MR personnel, the health care per-
sonnel, and the equipment itself. This function of
the MR personnel is directly under the authority
and responsibility of the MR medical director or
the level 2-designated (see section B.2.b, below)
physician of the day for the MR site.
Zone III regions should be physically restricted
from general public access by, for example, key
locks, passkey locking systems, or any other reli-
able, physically restricting method that can dif-
ferentiate between MR personnel and non-MR
personnel. The use of combination locks is dis-
couraged as combinations often become more
widely distributed than initially intended, result-
ing in site restriction violations being more likely
with these devices. Only MR personnel shall be
provided free access, such as the access keys or
passkeys, to Zone III.
There should be no exceptions to this guideline.
Specifically, this includes hospital or site adminis-
tration, physician, security, and other non-MR per-
sonnel (see section B.2.c, below). Non-MR
personnel are not to be provided with independent
Zone III access until such time as they undergo the
proper education and training to become MR per-
sonnel themselves. Zone III, or at the very least the
area within it wherein the static magnetic field’s
strength exceeds 5-Gauss should be demarcated
and clearly marked as being potentially hazardous.
Because magnetic fields are three-dimensional
volumes, Zone III controlled access areas may
project through floors and ceilings of MRI suites,
imposing magnetic field hazards on persons on
floors other than that of the MR scanner. Zones
of magnetic field hazard should be clearly
delineated, even in typically nonoccupied areas
such as rooftops or storage rooms, and access to
these Zone III areas should be similarly restricted
from non-MR personnel as they would be inside
any other Zone III region associated with the MRI
suite. For this reason, magnetic field strength
plots for all MRI systems should be analyzed in
vertical section as well as in horizontal plan,
identifying areas above or below, in addition to
areas on the same level, where persons may be
at risk of interactions with the magnetic field.
d. Zone IV: This area is synonymous with the MR
scanner magnet room itself, i.e., the physical
confines of the room within which the MR
scanner is located (see Appendix 3). Zone IV, by
definition, will always be located within Zone III,
as it is the MR magnet and its associated mag-
netic field that generates the existence of Zone
III. Zone IV should also be demarcated and
clearly marked as being potentially hazardous
due to the presence of very strong magnetic
fields. As part of the Zone IV site restriction, all
MR installations should provide for direct visual
observation by level 2 personnel to access path-
ways into Zone IV. By means of illustration only,
the MR technologists would be able to directly
observe and control, by means of line of site or
by means of video monitors, the entrances or
access corridors to Zone IV from their normal
positions when stationed at their desks in the
scan control room.
Zone IV should be clearly marked with a red light
and lighted sign stating, ‘‘The Magnet is On’’.
Ideally, signage should inform the public that the
magnetic field is active even when power to the
facility is deactivated. Except for resistive sys-
tems, this light and sign should be illuminated at
all times and should be provided with a battery
backup energy source to continue to remain
illuminated in the event of a loss of power to
the site.
In case of cardiac or respiratory arrest or other
medical emergency within Zone IV for which
emergent medical intervention or resuscitation is
required, appropriately trained and certified MR
personnel should immediately initiate basic life
support or CPR as required by the situation
while the patient is being emergently removed
from Zone IV to a predetermined, magnetically
safe location. All priorities should be focused on
stabilizing (e.g., basic life support with cardiac
compressions and manual ventilation) and then
evacuating the patient as rapidly and safely as
possible from the magnetic environment that
might restrict safe resuscitative efforts.
Furthermore, for logistical safety reasons, the
patient should always be moved from Zone IV to the
prospectively identified location where full resusci-
tative efforts are to continue (see Appendix 3).
Quenching the magnet (for superconducting sys-
tems only) is not routinely advised for cardiac or
respiratory arrest or other medical emergency,
because quenching the magnet and having the
magnetic field dissipate could easily take more
than a minute. Furthermore, as quenching a
magnet can theoretically be hazardous, ideally
one should evacuate the magnet room, when
possible, for an intentional quench. One should
rather use that time wisely to initiate life support
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measures while removing the patient from Zone
IV to a location where the strength of the mag-
netic field is insufficient to be a medical concern.
Zones III and IV site access restriction must be
maintained during resuscitation and other emer-
gent situations for the protection of all involved.
2. MR Personnel and non-MR personnel
a. All individuals working within at least Zone III of the
MR environment should be documented as having
successfully completed at least one of the MR safety
live lectures or prerecorded presentations approved
by the MR medical director. Attendance should be
repeated at least annually, and appropriate docu-
mentation should be provided to confirm these
ongoing educational efforts. These individuals shall
be referred to henceforth as MR personnel.
b. There are two levels of MR personnel:
1. Level 1 MR personnel: Those who have passed
minimal safety educational efforts to ensure their
own safety as they work within Zone III will be
referred to henceforth as level 1 MR personnel.
2. Level 2 MR personnel: Those who have been
more extensively trained and educated in the
broader aspects of MR safety issues, including,
for example, issues related to the potential for
thermal loading or burns and direct neuromus-
cular excitation from rapidly changing gradients,
will be referred to henceforth as level 2 MR per-
sonnel. It is the responsibility of the MR medical
director not only to identify the necessary train-
ing, but also to identify those individuals who
qualify as level 2 MR personnel. It is understood
that the medical director will have the necessary
education and experience in MR safety to qualify
as level 2 MR personnel. (See Appendix 1.)
c. All those not having successfully complied with
these MR safety instruction guidelines shall be
referred to henceforth as non-MR personnel. Specifi-
cally, non-MR personnel will be the terminology
used to refer to any individual or group who has not
within the previous 12 months undergone the desig-
nated formal training in MR safety issues defined by
the MR safety director of that installation.
3. Patient and non-MR personnel screening
a. All non-MR personnel wishing to enter Zone III
must first pass an MR safety screening process.
Only MR personnel are authorized to perform an
MR safety screen before permitting non-MR per-
sonnel into Zone III.
b. The screening process and screening forms for
patients, non-MR personnel, and MR personnel
should be essentially identical. Specifically, one
should assume that screened non-MR personnel,
health care practitioners, or MR personnel may
enter the bore of the MR imager during the MR
imaging process.
Examples of this might include if a pediatric
patient cries for his mother, who then leans into
the bore, or if the anesthetist leans into the bore
to manually ventilate a patient in the event of a
problem.
c. Metal detectors
The usage in MR environments of conventional
metal detectors which do not differentiate between
ferrous and nonferromagnetic materials is not rec-
ommended. Reasons for this recommendation
against conventional metal detector usage include,
among others:
1. They have varied—and variable—sensitivity
settings.
2. The skills of the operators can vary.
3. Today’s conventional metal detectors cannot
detect, for example, a 2  3 mm, potentially
dangerous ferromagnetic metal fragment in the
orbit or near the spinal cord or heart.
4. Today’s conventional metal detectors do not dif-
ferentiate between ferromagnetic and nonferro-
magnetic metallic objects, implants, or foreign
bodies.
5. Metal detectors should not be necessary for the
detection of large metallic objects, such as oxy-
gen tanks on the gurney with the patients.
These objects are fully expected to be detected –
and physically excluded – during the routine
patient screening process.
However, ferromagnetic detection systems are cur-
rently available that are simple to operate, capable
of detecting even very small ferromagnetic objects
external to the patient, and differentiating between
ferromagnetic and non-ferromagnetic materials.
While the use of conventional metal detectors is
not recommended, the use of ferromagnetic detec-
tion systems is recommended as an adjunct to
thorough and conscientious screening of persons
and devices approaching Zone IV. It should be reit-
erated that their use is in no way meant to replace
a thorough screening practice, which rather
should be supplemented by their usage.
d. Non-MR personnel should be accompanied by, or
under the immediate supervision of and in visual
or verbal contact with, one specifically identified
level 2 MR person for the entirety of their duration
within Zone III or IV restricted regions. However, it
is acceptable to have them in a changing room or
restroom in Zone III without visual contact as long
as the personnel and the patient can communicate
verbally with each other.
Level 1 MR personnel are permitted unaccompa-
nied access throughout Zones III and IV. Level 1
MR personnel are also explicitly permitted to be
responsible for accompanying non-MR personnel
into and throughout Zone III, excluding Zone IV.
However, level 1 MR personnel are not permitted
to directly admit, or be designated responsible for,
non-MR personnel in Zone IV.
In the event of a shift change, lunch break, etc.,
no level 2 MR personnel shall relinquish their
responsibility to supervise non-MR personnel still
within Zone III or IV until such supervision has
been formally transferred to another of the site’s
level 2 MR personnel.
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e. Nonemergent patients should be MR safety screened
on site by a minimum of 2 separate individuals. At
least one of these individuals should be level 2 MR
personnel. At least one of these 2 screens should be
performed verbally or interactively.
Emergent patients and their accompanying non-
MR personnel may be screened only once, provid-
ing the screening individual is level 2 MR person-
nel. There should be no exceptions to this.
f. Any individual undergoing an MR procedure must
remove all readily removable metallic personal
belongings and devices on or in them (e.g.,
watches, jewelry, pagers, cell phones, body pierc-
ings (if removable), contraceptive diaphragms, me-
tallic drug delivery patches (see Section I, below),
cosmetics containing metallic particles (such as
eye make-up), and clothing items which may
contain metallic fasteners, hooks, zippers, loose
metallic components or metallic threads). It is
therefore advisable to require that the patients or
research subjects wear a site-supplied gown with
no metal fasteners when feasible.
g. All patients and non-MR personnel with a history
of potential ferromagnetic foreign object penetra-
tion must undergo further investigation before
being permitted entrance to Zone III. Examples of
acceptable methods of screening include patient
history, plain X-ray films, prior CT or MR studies
of the questioned anatomic area, or access to writ-
ten documentation as to the type of implant or for-
eign object that might be present. Once positive
identification has been made as to the type of
implant or foreign object that is within a patient,
best effort assessments should be made to identify
the MR compatibility or MR safety of the implant
or object. Efforts at identification might include
written records of the results of formal testing of
the implant before implantation (preferred), prod-
uct labeling regarding the implant or object, and
peer-reviewed publications regarding MR compati-
bility and MR safety testing of the specific make,
model, and type of the object. MR safety testing
would be of value only if the object or device had
not been altered since such testing had been
published and only if it can be confirmed that the
testing was performed on an object of precisely the
same make, model, and type.
All patients who have a history of orbit trauma by
a potential ferromagnetic foreign body for which
they sought medical attention are to have their
orbits cleared by either plain X-ray orbit films
(2 views) (11,12) or by a radiologist’s review and
assessment of contiguous cut prior CT or MR
images (obtained since the suspected traumatic
event) if available.
h. Conscious, nonemergent patients and research
and volunteer subjects are to complete written MR
safety screening questionnaires before their intro-
duction to Zone III. Family or guardians of nonres-
ponsive patients or of patients who cannot reliably
provide their own medical histories are to complete
a written MR safety screening questionnaire before
their introduction to Zone III. These completed
questionnaires are then to be reviewed orally with
the patient, guardian, or research subject in their
entirety before permitting the patient or research
subject to be cleared into Zone III.
The patient, guardian, or research subject as well
as the screening MR staff member must both sign
the completed form. This form should then become
part of the patient’s medical record. No empty
responses will be accepted—each question must be
answered with a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ or specific further in-
formation must be provided as requested. A sam-
ple pre-MR screening form is provided (see
Appendix 2). This is the minimum information to
be obtained; more may be added if the site so
desires.
i. Screening of the patient or non-MR personnel
with, or suspected of having, an intracranial aneu-
rysm clip should be performed as per the separate
MR safe practice guideline addressing this particu-
lar topic (see section M, below).
j. Screening of patients for whom an MR examina-
tion is deemed clinically indicated or necessary,
but who are unconscious or unresponsive, who
cannot provide their own reliable histories regard-
ing prior possible exposures to surgery, trauma, or
metallic foreign objects, and for whom such histor-
ies cannot be reliably obtained from others:
1. If no reliable patient metal exposure history can
be obtained, and if the requested MR examina-
tion cannot reasonably wait until a reliable his-
tory might be obtained, it is recommended that
such patients be physically examined by level 2
MR personnel. All areas of scars or deformities
that might be anatomically indicative of an
implant, such as on the chest or spine region,
and whose origins are unknown and which may
have been caused by ferromagnetic foreign
bodies, implants, etc., should be subject to
plain-film radiography (if recently obtained
plain films or CT or MR studies of such areas
are not already available). The investigation
described above should be made to ensure
there are no potentially harmful embedded or
implanted metallic foreign objects or devices. All
such patients should also undergo plain film
imaging of the skull or orbits and chest to
exclude metallic foreign objects (if recently
obtained such radiographic or MR information
not already available).
2. Monitoring of patients in the MR scanner is
sometimes necessary. However, monitoring
methods should be chosen carefully due to the
risk of thermal injury associated with monitor-
ing equipment in the MR environment. Sedated,
anesthetized, or unconscious patients may not
be able to express symptoms of such injury.
This potential for injury is greater on especially
higher field whole body scanners (e.g., 1 Tesla
and above), but exists at least theoretically at
all MR imaging field strengths. MR Conditional
EKG electrodes should be used and leads
should be kept from touching the patients dur-
ing the scan. Patients who require EKG
506 Kanal et al.
monitoring and who are unconscious, sedated,
or anesthetized should be examined after each
imaging sequence with potential repositioning
of the EKG leads and any other electrically con-
ductive material with which the patient is in
contact. Alternatively, cold compresses or ice
packs could be placed upon all necessary elec-
trically conductive material that touches the
patient during scanning.
Distortion of the electrocardiogram within the
magnetic field can make interpretation of the ECG
complex unreliable, even with filtering used by
contemporary monitoring systems. Routine moni-
toring of heart rate and rhythm may also be
accomplished using pulse oximetry, which would
eliminate the risks of thermal injury from
electrocardiography.
k. Final determination of whether or not to scan any
given patient with any given implant, foreign body,
etc. is to be made by the level 2 designated attend-
ing MR radiologist, the MR medical director, or
specifically designated level 2 MR personnel follow-
ing criteria for acceptability predetermined by the
medical director. These risks include, among
others, consideration of mechanical and thermal
risks associated with MR imaging of implants, as
well as assessments of the safety of exposure of
the device to the electromagnetic forces used in
the MR imaging process.
For implants that are strongly ferromagnetic, an
obvious concern is that of magnetic translational
and rotational forces upon the implant which
might move or dislodge the device from its
implanted position If an implant has demonstrated
weak ferromagnetic forces on formal testing, it
might be prudent to wait several weeks for fibrous
scarring to set in, as this may help anchor the
implant in position and help it resist such weakly
attractive magnetic forces that might arise in MR
environments.
For all implants that have been demonstrated to
be nonferrous in nature, however, the risk of
implant motion is essentially reduced to those
resulting from Lenz’s forces alone. These tend to
be quite trivial for typical metallic implant sizes of
a few centimeters or less. Thus, a waiting period
for fibrous scarring to set in is far less important,
and the advisability for such a waiting period may
well be easily outweighed by the potential clinical
benefits of undergoing an MR examination at that
time. As always, clinical assessment of the risk
benefit ratio for the particular clinical situation
and patient at hand are paramount for appropriate
medical decision making in these scenarios.
It is possible that during the course of a magnetic
resonance imaging examination an unanticipated
ferromagnetic implant or foreign body is discov-
ered within a patient or research subject under-
going the examination. This is typically suspected
or detected by means of a sizable field-distorting
artifact seen on spin echo imaging techniques that
grows more obvious on longer TE studies and
expands markedly on typical moderate or long TE
gradient echo imaging sequences. In such cases, it
is imperative that the medical director, safety offi-
cer, and/or physician in charge be immediately
notified of the suspected findings. This individual
should then assess the situation, review the imag-
ing information obtained, and decide what the
best course of action might be.
It should be noted that there are numerous poten-
tially acceptable courses that might be recom-
mended which in turn are dependent upon many
factors, including the status of the patient, the loca-
tion of the suspected ferromagnetic implant/foreign
body relative to local anatomic structures, the mass
of the implant, etc. Appropriate course of actions
might include proceeding with the scan under way,
immobilizing the patient and the immediate re-
moval from the scanner, or other intermediate
steps. Regardless of the course of action selected, it
is important to note that the forces on the implant
will change, and may actually increase, during the
attempt to remove the patient from the scanner
bore. Furthermore, the greater the rate of motion of
the patient/device through the magnetic fields of
the scanner bore the greater the forces acting upon
that device will likely be. Thus it is prudent to
ensure that if at all possible, immobilization of the
device during patient extraction from the bore, and
slow, cautious, deliberate rate of extricating the
patient from the bore, will likely result in weaker
and potentially less harmful forces on the device as
it traverses the various static magnetic field gra-
dients associated with the MR imager.
It is also worthy of note that the magnetic fields
associated with the MR scanner are three dimen-
sional. Thus, especially for superconducting sys-
tems, one should avoid the temptation to have the
patient sit up as soon as they are physically out of
the bore. Doing so may expose the ferrous object
to still significant torque- and translation-related
forces despite their being physically outside the
scanner bore. It is therefore advisable to continue
to extract the patient along a straight line course
parallel to the center of the magnet while the
patient remains immobilized until they are as far
as physically possible from the MR imager itself,
before any other patient/object motion vector is
attempted or permitted.
l. All non-MR personnel (e.g., patients, volunteers,
varied site employees and professionals) with
implanted cardiac pacemakers, implantable cardi-
overter defibrillators (ICDs), diaphragmatic pace-
makers, electromechanically activated devices, or
other electrically conductive devices upon which
the non-MR personnel is dependent should be pre-
cluded from Zone IV and physically restrained
from the 5-Gauss line unless specifically cleared
in writing by a level 2 designated attending radiol-
ogist or the medical director of the MR site. In
such circumstances, specific defending risk-bene-
fit rationale should be provided in writing and
signed by the authorizing radiologist.
Should it be determined that non-MR personnel
wishing to accompany a patient into an MR scan
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room require their orbits to be cleared by plain-film
radiography, a radiologist must first discuss with
the non-MR personnel that plain X-ray films of their
orbits are required before permitting them access to
the MR scan room. Should they still wish to proceed
with access to Zone IV or within the 5-G line, and
should the attending radiologist deem it medically
advisable that they do so (e.g., for the care of their
child about to undergo an MR study), written
informed consent should be provided by these
accompanying non-MR personnel before their
undergoing X-ray examination of their orbits.
m. MR scanning of patients, prisoners, or parolees
with metallic prisoner-restraining devices or RF ID
or tracking bracelets could lead to theoretical
adverse events, including: (i) ferromagnetic attrac-
tive effects and resultant patient injury, (ii) possi-
ble ferromagnetic attractive effects and potential
damage to the device or its battery pack, (iii) RF
interference with the MRI study and secondary
image artifact, (iv) RF interference with the func-
tionality of the device, (v) RF power deposition and
heating of the bracelet or tagging device or its cir-
cuitry and secondary patient injury (if the bracelet
would be in the anatomic volume of the RF trans-
mitter coil being used for imaging). Therefore, in
cases where requested to scan a patient, prisoner,
or parolee wearing RF bracelets or metallic hand-
cuffs or anklecuffs, request that the patient be
accompanied by the appropriate authorities who
can and will remove the restraining device before
the MR study and be charged with its replacement
following the examination.
n. Firefighter, police, and security safety considera-
tions: For the safety of firefighters and other emer-
gent services responding to an emergent call at the
MR site, it is recommended that all fire alarms,
cardiac arrests, or other emergent service response
calls originating from or located in the MR site
should be forwarded simultaneously to a specifi-
cally designated individual from amongst the site’s
MR personnel. This individual should, if possible,
be on site before the arrival of the firefighters or
emergent responders to ensure that they do not
have free access to Zone III or IV. The site might
consider assigning appropriately trained security
personnel, who have been trained and designated
as MR personnel, to respond to such calls.
In any case, all MR sites should arrange to pro-
spectively educate their local fire marshals, fire-
fighters associations, and police or security
personnel about the potential hazards of respond-
ing to emergencies in the MR suite.
It should be stressed that even in the presence of a
true fire (or other emergency) in Zone III or IV, the
magnetic fields may be present and fully operational.
Therefore, free access to Zone III or IV by firefighters
or other non-MR personnel with air tanks, axes,
crowbars, other firefighting equipment, guns, etc
might prove catastrophic or even lethal to those
responding or others in the vicinity.
As part of the Zone III and IV restrictions, all MR
sites must have clearly marked, readily accessible
MR Conditional or MR Safe fire extinguishing equip-
ment physically stored within Zone III or IV.
All conventional fire extinguishers and other fire-
fighting equipment not tested and verified safe in
the MR environment should be restricted from
Zone III.
For superconducting magnets, the helium (and the
nitrogen as well, in older MR magnets) is not flam-
mable and does not pose a fire hazard directly.
However, the liquid oxygen that can result from
the supercooled air in the vicinity of the released
gases might well increase the fire hazard in this
area. If there are appropriately trained and knowl-
edgeable MR personnel available during an emer-
gency to ensure that emergency response
personnel are kept out of the MR scanner or mag-
net room and 5-Gauss line, quenching the magnet
during a response to an emergency or fire should
not be a requirement.
However, if the fire is in such a location where
Zone III or IV needs to be entered for whatever rea-
son by firefighting or emergency response person-
nel and their firefighting and emergent equipment,
such as air tanks, crowbars, axes, defibrillators, a
decision to quench a superconducting magnet
should be very seriously considered to protect the
health and lives of the emergent responding per-
sonnel. Should a quench be performed, appropri-
ately designated MR personnel still need to ensure
that all non-MR personnel (including and espe-
cially emergently response personnel) continue to
be restricted from Zones III and IV until the desig-
nated MR personnel has personally verified that
the static field is either no longer detectable or at
least sufficiently attenuated as to no longer pres-
ent a potential hazard to one moving by it with, for
example, large ferromagnetic objects such as air
tanks or axes.
For resistive systems, the magnetic field of the MR
scanner should be shut down as completely as
possible and verified as such before permitting the
emergency response personnel access to Zone IV.
For permanent, resistive, or hybrid systems whose
magnetic fields cannot be completely shut down,
MR personnel should ideally be available to warn
the emergency response personnel that a very
powerful magnetic field is still operational in the
magnet room.
4. MR Personnel Screening
All MR personnel are to undergo an MR-screening
process as part of their employment interview process
to ensure their safety in the MR environment. For
their own protection and for the protection of the non-
MR personnel under their supervision, all MR person-
nel must immediately report to the MR medical direc-
tor any trauma, procedure, or surgery they experience
or undergo where a ferromagnetic object or device
may have become introduced within or on them. This
will permit appropriate screening to be performed on
the employee to determine the safety of permitting
that employee into Zone III.
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5. Device and Object Screening
Ferrous objects, including those brought by patients,
visitors, contractors, etc., should be restricted from
entering Zone III, whenever practical.
As part of the Zone III site restriction and equip-
ment testing and clearing responsibilities, all sites
should have ready access to a strong handheld mag-
net (1000-Gauss) and/or a handheld ferromagnetic
detection device. This will enable the site to test exter-
nal, and even some superficial internal devices or
implants for the presence of grossly detectable ferro-
magnetic attractive forces.
a. All portable metallic or partially metallic devices
that are on or external to the patient (e.g., oxy-
gen cylinders) are to be positively identified in
writing as MR Unsafe or, alternatively, MR Safe
or MR Conditional in the MR environment before
permitting them into Zone III Figure 2. For all
device or object screening, verification and posi-
tive identification should be in writing. Exam-
ples of devices that need to be positively
identified include fire extinguishers, oxygen
tanks and aneurysm clips.
b. External devices or objects demonstrated to be
ferromagnetic and MR Unsafe or incompatible in
the MR environment may still, under specific cir-
cumstances, be brought into Zone III if for exam-
ple, they are deemed by MR personnel to be
necessary and appropriate for patient care. They
should only be brought into Zone III if they are
under the direct supervision of specifically desig-
nated level 1 or level 2 MR personnel who are
thoroughly familiar with the device, its function,
and the reason supporting its introduction to
Zone III. The safe usage of these devices while
they are present in Zone III will be the responsi-
bility of specifically named level 1 or 2 MR per-
sonnel. These devices must be appropriately
physically secured or restricted at all times dur-
ing which they are in Zone III to ensure that they
do not inadvertently come too close to the MR
scanner and accidentally become exposed to
static magnetic fields or gradients that might
result in their becoming either hazardous projec-
tiles or no longer accurately functional.
c. Never assume MR compatibility or safety infor-
mation about the device if it is not clearly docu-
mented in writing. All unknown external objects
or devices being considered for introduction
beyond Zone II should be tested with a strong
handheld magnet (1000-Gauss) and/or a hand-
held ferromagnetic detection device for ferromag-
netic properties before permitting them entry to
Zone III. The results of such testing, as well
as the date, time, and name of the tester, and
methodology used for that particular device,
should be documented in writing. If a device has
not been tested, or if its MR compatibility or
safety status is unknown, it should not be per-
mitted unrestricted access to Zone III.
d. All portable metallic or partially metallic objects
that are to be brought into Zone IV must be prop-
erly identified and appropriately labeled using
the current FDA labeling criteria developed by
ASTM International in standard ASTM F2503
(http://www.astm.org). Those items which are
wholly, nonmetallic should be identified with a
square green ‘‘MR Safe’’ label. Items which are
clearly ferromagnetic should be identified as ‘‘MR
Unsafe’’ and labeled appropriately with the corre-
sponding round red label. Objects with an MR
Conditional rating should be affixed with a trian-
gular yellow MR Conditional label before being
brought into the scan room/Zone IV.
As noted in the introduction to this section B.5,
above, if MR safety data is not prospectively
available for a piece of equipment or object that
requires electricity (or battery power) to operate,
it should not be brought into Zone IV without
being subjected to the testing outlined in ASTM
F2503. If MR safety data is not prospectively
available for a given object that is not electrically
activated (e.g., wash basins, scrub brushes, step
stools), initial testing for the purpose of this
labeling is to be accomplished by the site’s MR
personnel exposing the object to a handheld
magnet (1000-Gauss). If grossly detectable
attractive forces are observed between the object
being tested or any of its components and the
handheld magnet, it is to be labeled with a
Figure 2. U.S. Food and Drug Administration labeling crite-
ria (developed by ASTM [American Society for Testing and
Materials] International) for portable objects taken into Zone
IV. Square green ‘‘MR safe’’ label is for wholly nonmetallic
objects, triangular yellow label is for objects with ‘‘MR condi-
tional’’ rating, and round red label is for ‘‘MR unsafe’’ objects.
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circular red ‘‘MR Unsafe’’ label. If no attractive
forces are observed, a triangular yellow ‘‘MR Con-
ditional’’ label is to be attached to the object. It is
only when the composition of an object and its
components are known to be nonmetallic and
not electrically conductive that the green ‘‘MR
Safe’’ label is to be affixed to a device or object.
Particularly with regard to nonclinical and inci-
dental equipment, current products marketed
with ill-defined terminology such as ‘‘nonmag-
netic’’, or outdated classifications such as ‘‘MR
compatible’’, should not be presumed to conform
to a particular current ASTM classification. Simi-
larly, any product marketed as ‘‘MR safe’’ but
with metallic construction or components should
be treated with suspicion. Objects intended for
use in Zone IV, including nonclinical incidental
products such as stepping stools or ladders,
which are not accompanied by manufacturer or
third-party MR safety test results under the
ASTM F2503 criteria, should be site tested as
described above.
e. Decisions based on published MR compatibility
or safety claims should recognize that all such
claims apply to specifically tested static field and
static gradient field, strengths and only to the
precise model, make, and identification of the
tested object. For example, ‘‘MR Conditional hav-
ing been tested to be safe at 3.0 Tesla at gradient
strengths of 400-G/cm or less and normal oper-
ating mode.’’,
f. It should be noted that alterations performed by
the site on MR Safe, MR Unsafe, and MR Condi-
tional equipment or devices may alter the MR
safety or compatibility properties of the device.
For example, tying a ferromagnetic metallic twist-
ing binder onto a sign labeling the device as MR
Conditional or MR Safe might result in artifact
induction – or worse – if introduced into the MR
scanner.
Lenz’s Forces:
Faraday’s Law states that a moving or changing mag-
netic field will induce a voltage in a perpendicularly
oriented electrical conductor. Lenz’s Law builds upon
this and states that the induced voltage will itself be
such that it will secondarily generate its own magnetic
field whose orientation and magnitude will oppose
that of the initial time varying magnetic field that cre-
ated it in the first place. For example, if an electrical
conductor is moved perpendicularly toward the mag-
netic field B0 of an MR scanner, even if this conductor
is not grossly ferromagnetic, the motion itself will
result in the generation of voltages within this con-
ductor whose magnitude is directly proportional to
the rate of motion as well as the spatial gradient of
magnetic field B0 through which it is being moved.
Conducting objects turning in the static field will also
experience a torque due to the induced eddy currents.
Lenz’s law states that this induced current will in
turn create a magnetic field whose orientation will
oppose the B0 magnetic field that created this
current.
Thus, moving a large metallic but nonferromagnetic
electrical conductor toward the magnet bore will
result in the induction of a voltage and associated
magnetic field which will orient in such a manner and
at such a strength to oppose the motion of the metal-
lic object into the bore of the MR scanner. If, for exam-
ple, one tries to move a nonferrous oxygen tank into
the bore of an MR scanner, as the scanner bore is
approached Lenz’s forces will be sufficiently strong to
virtually stop forward progress of the tank. Further-
more, the faster one moves the tank into the bore, the
greater the opposing force that is created to stop this
motion.
This also has potential consequence for large
implanted metallic devices such as certain metallic
nonferrous infusion pumps. Although they may not
pose a projectile hazard, rapid motion of the patient/
implant perpendicular to the magnetic field of the MR
imager can be expected to result in forces on the
implant that would oppose this motion and may likely
be detected by the patient. If the patient were to com-
plain of experiencing forces tugging or pulling on the
implant, this might bring the patient or health care
personnel to erroneously conclude that there were
ferrous components to the device, and possible can-
cellation of the examination. Slowly moving such large
metallic devices into and out of the bore is a key
factor in decreasing any Lenz’s forces that might be
induced, and decrease the likelihood of a misunder-
standing or unnecessary study cancellation.
C. MR Technologist
1. MR technologists should be in compliance with
the technologist qualifications listed in the MR
Accreditation Program Requirements.
2. Except for emergent coverage, there will be a
minimum of 2 MR technologists or one MR tech-
nologist and one other individual with the desig-
nation of MR personnel in the immediate Zone II
through Zone IV MR environment. For emergent
coverage, the MR technologist can scan with no
other individuals in their Zone II through Zone IV
environment as long as there is in-house, ready
emergent coverage by designated department of
radiology MR personnel (e.g., radiology house
staff or radiology attending).
D. Pregnancy Related Issues
1. Health Care Practitioner Pregnancies:
Pregnant health care practitioners are permitted to
work in and around the MR environment throughout
all stages of their pregnancy (13). Acceptable activities
include, but are not limited to, positioning patients,
scanning, archiving, injecting contrast, and entering
the MR scan room in response to an emergency.
Although permitted to work in and around the MR
environment, pregnant health care practitioners are
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requested not to remain within the MR scanner
bore or Zone IV during actual data acquisition or
scanning.
2. Patient Pregnancies
Present data have not conclusively documented any
deleterious effects of MR imaging exposure on the
developing fetus. Therefore no special consideration is
recommended for the first, versus any other, trimester
in pregnancy. Nevertheless, as with all interventions
during pregnancy, it is prudent to screen females of
reproductive age for pregnancy before permitting
them access to MR imaging environments. If preg-
nancy is established consideration should be given to
reassessing the potential risks versus benefits of the
pending study in determining whether the requested
MR examination could safely wait to the end of the
pregnancy before being performed.
a. Pregnant patients can be accepted to undergo MR
scans at any stage of pregnancy if, in the determi-
nation of a level 2 MR personnel-designated attend-
ing radiologist, the risk–benefit ratio to the patient
warrants that the study be performed. The radiol-
ogist should confer with the referring physician
and document the following in the radiology report
or the patient’s medical record:
1. The information requested from the MR study
cannot be acquired by means of nonionizing
means (e.g., ultrasonography).
2. The data is needed to potentially affect the care
of the patient or fetus during the pregnancy.
3. The referring physician believes that it is not
prudent to wait until the patient is no longer
pregnant to obtain this data.
b. MR contrast agents should not be routinely pro-
vided to pregnant patients. This decision too, is on
that must be made on a case-by-case basis by the
covering level 2 MR personnel-designated attending
radiologist who will assess the risk–benefit ratio for
that particular patient.
The decision to administer a gadolinium-based MR
contrast agent to pregnant patients should be
accompanied by a well-documented and thoughtful
risk–benefit analysis. This analysis should be able
to defend a decision to administer the contrast
agent based on overwhelming potential benefit to
the patient or fetus outweighing the theoretical but
potentially real risks of long-term exposure of the
developing fetus to free gadolinium ions.
Studies have demonstrated that at least some of
the gadolinium-based MR contrast agents readily
pass through the placental barrier and enter the fe-
tal circulation. From here, they are filtered in the
fetal kidneys and then excreted into the amniotic
fluid. In this location the gadolinium-chelate mole-
cules are in a relatively protected space and may
remain in this amniotic fluid for an indeterminate
amount of time before finally being reabsorbed and
eliminated. As with any equilibrium situation
involving any dissociation constant, the longer the
chelated molecule remains in this space, the
greater the potential for dissociation of the poten-
tially toxic gadolinium ion from its ligand. It is
unclear what impact such free gadolinium ions
might have if they were to be released in any quan-
tity in the amniotic fluid. Certainly, deposition into
the developing fetus would raise concerns of possi-
ble secondary adverse effects.
The risk to the fetus of gadolinium based MR con-
trast agent administration remains unknown and
may be harmful.
E. Pediatric MR Safety Concerns
1. Sedation and Monitoring Issues
Children form the largest group requiring sedation for
MRI, largely because of their inability to remain
motionless during scans. Sedation protocols may vary
from institution to institution according to procedures
performed (diagnostic vs. interventional), the complex-
ity of the patient population (healthy preschoolers vs.
premature infants), the method of sedation (mild
sedation vs. general anesthesia) and the qualifications
of the sedation provider.
Adherence to standards of care mandates following
the sedation guidelines developed by the American
Academy of Pediatrics (14,15), the American Society
of Anesthesiologists (16), and the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (17). In
addition, sedation providers must comply with
protocols established by the individual state and the
practicing institution. These guidelines require the fol-
lowing provisions:
a. Preprocedural medical history and examination
for each patient
b. Fasting guidelines appropriate for age
c. Uniform training and credentialing for sedation
providers
d. Intraprocedural and post procedural monitors
with adaptors appropriately sized for children
(MR Conditional equipment)
e. Method of patient observation (window, camera)
f. Resuscitation equipment, including oxygen deliv-
ery and suction
g. Uniform system of record keeping and charting
(with continuous assessment and recording of
vital signs)
h. Location and protocol for recovery and discharge
i. Quality assurance program that tracks complica-
tions and morbidity.
For the neonatal and the young pediatric population,
special attention is needed in monitoring body temper-
ature for both hypo- and hyperthermia in addition to
other vital signs (18). Temperature monitoring equip-
ment that is approved for use in the MR suite is readily
available. Commercially available, MR-approved neo-
natal isolation transport units and other warming devi-
ces are also available for use during MR scans.
2. Pediatric Screening Issues
Children may not be reliable historians and, espe-
cially for older children and teenagers, should be
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questioned both in the presence of parents or guardi-
ans and separately to maximize the possibility that all
potential dangers are disclosed. Therefore, it is recom-
mended that they be gowned before entering Zone IV
to help ensure that no metallic objects, toys, etc. inad-
vertently find their way into Zone IV. Pillows, stuffed
animals, and other comfort items brought from home
represent real risks and should be discouraged from
entering Zone IV. If unavoidable, each should be care-
fully checked with a powerful handheld magnet and/
or ferromagnetic detector and perhaps again in the
MR scanner before permitting the patient to enter
Zone IV with them to ensure that they do not contain
any objectionable metallic components.
3. MR Safety of Accompanying Family or Personnel:
Although any age patient might request that others
accompany them for their MR examination, this is far
more common in the pediatric population. Those
accompanying or remaining with the patient should
be screened using the same criteria as anyone else
entering Zone IV.
In general, it would be prudent to limit accompany-
ing adults to a single individual. Only a qualified,
responsible MR physician should make screening
criteria exceptions.
Hearing protection and MR safe/MR conditional
seating are recommended for accompanying family
members within the MR scan room.
F. Time Varying Gradient Magnetic Field Related
Issues: Induced Voltages
Types of patients needing extra caution:
Patients with implanted or retained wires in anatomi-
cally or functionally sensitive areas (e.g., myocardium
or epicardium, implanted electrodes in the brain)
should be considered at higher risk, especially from
faster MRI sequences, such as echo planar imaging
(which may be used in such sequences as diffusion-
weighted imaging, functional imaging, perfusion
weighted imaging, MR angiographic imaging, etc.).
The decision to limit the dB/dt (rate of magnetic field
change) and maximum strength of the magnetic field
of the gradient subsystems during imaging of such
patients should be reviewed by the level 2 MR person-
nel-designated attending radiologist supervising the
case or patient.
G. Time Varying Gradient Magnetic Field Related
Issues: Auditory Considerations
1. All patients and volunteers should be offered and
encouraged to use hearing protection before
undergoing any imaging in any MR scanners.
FDA’s current MR Guidance Document (Attach-
ment B entitled, ‘‘Recommended User Instruc-
tions for a Magnetic Resonance Diagnostic
Device’’) states that instructions from manufac-
turers of MR equipment should state that hear-
ing protection is required for all patients studied
on MR imaging systems capable of producing
sound pressures that exceed 99 dB(A). The Inter-
national standard on this issue (IEC 60601-2-33:
‘‘Particular requirements for the basic safety and
essential performance of magnetic resonance
equipment for medical diagnosis’’), also states
that, for all equipment capable of producing
more than an A-weighted rms sound pressure
level of 99dB(A), hearing protection shall be used
for the safety of the patient and that this hearing
protection shall be sufficient to reduce the A-
weighted r.m.s. sound pressure level to below 99
dB(A).
2. All patients or volunteers in whom research
sequences are to be performed (i.e., MR scan
sequences that have not yet been approved by
the Food and Drug Administration) are to have
hearing protective devices in place before initiat-
ing any MR sequences. Without hearing protec-
tion in place, MRI sequences that are not FDA
approved should not be performed on patients or
volunteers.
H. Time Varying Radiofrequency Magnetic Field
Related Issues: Thermal
1. All unnecessary or unused electrically conductive
materials external to the patient should be
removed from the MR system before the onset of
imaging. It is not sufficient to merely to ‘‘unplug’’
or disconnect unused, unnecessary electrically
conductive material and leave it within the MR
scanner with the patient during imaging. All elec-
trical connections, such as on surface coil leads
or monitoring devices must be visually checked
by the scanning MR technologist before each
usage to ensure the integrity of the thermal and
electrical insulation.
2. Electrical voltages and currents can be induced
within electrically conductive materials that are
within the bore of the MR imager during the MR
imaging process. This might result in the heating
of this material by resistive losses. This heat
might be of a caliber sufficient to cause injury to
human tissue. As noted in section H.9, among the
variables that determine the amount of induced
voltage or current is the consideration that the
larger the diameter of the conductive loops the
greater the potential induced voltages or currents
and, thus the greater the potential for resultant
thermal injury to adjacent or contiguous patient
tissue.
Therefore, when electrically conductive material
(wires, leads, implants, etc.), are required to
remain within the bore of the MR scanner with
the patient during imaging, care should be taken
to ensure that no large-caliber electrically con-
ducting loops (including patient tissue; see sec-
tion H. 5, below) are formed within the MR
scanner during imaging. Furthermore, it is possi-
ble, with the appropriate configuration, lead
length, static magnetic field strength, and other
settings, to introduce resonant circuitry between
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the transmitted RF power and the lead. This could
result in very rapid and clinically significant lead
heating, especially at the lead tips, in a matter of
seconds to a magnitude sufficient to result in tis-
sue thermal injury or burns. This can also theo-
retically occur with implanted leads or wires even
when they are not connected to any other device
at either end. For illustration, the FDA has noted
several reports of serious injury including coma
and permanent neurological impairment in
patients with implanted neurological stimulators
who underwent MR imaging examinations. The
injuries in these instances resulted from heating
of the electrode tips (19,20).
Furthermore, it is entirely possible for a lead or
wire to demonstrate no significant heating while
undergoing MR imaging examinations at 1.5 Tesla
yet demonstrate clinically significant and poten-
tially harmful degrees of heating within seconds
at, for example, 3 Tesla. It has also been demon-
strated that leads may demonstrate no significant
heating at 3 Tesla yet may rapidly heat to hazard-
ous levels when undergoing MR imaging at, for
example, 1.5 Tesla. (Personal Observation, MR
Safety testing, E. Kanal, MD, University of Pitts-
burgh Medical Center MR Research Center, 8/28/
05) Thus at no time should a label of MR Condi-
tional for thermal issues at a given field strength
be applied to any field strength, higher or lower,
other than the specific one at which safety was
demonstrated.
Thus, exposure of electrically conductive leads or
wires to the RF transmitted power during MR
scanning should only be performed with caution
and with appropriate steps taken to ensure signif-
icant lead or tissue heating does not result (see
section H.9, below).
3. When electrically conductive materials external to
the patient are required to be within the bore of
the MR scanner with the patient during imaging,
care should be taken to place thermal insulation
(including air, pads, etc.) between the patient and
the electrically conductive material, while simulta-
neously attempting to (as much as feasible) keep
the electrical conductor from directly contacting
the patient during imaging. It is also appropriate
to try to position the leads or wires as far as pos-
sible from the inner walls of the MR scanner if the
body coil is being used for RF transmission. When
it is necessary that electrically conductive leads
directly contact the patient during imaging, con-
sideration should be given to prophylactic appli-
cation of cold compresses or ice packs to such
areas.
4. There have been rare reports of thermal injuries/
burns associated with clothing that contained
electrically conductive materials, such as metallic
threads, electrically conductive designs, and silver
impregnated clothing. As such, consideration
should be given to having all patients remove
their own clothing and instead change into pro-
vided gowns to cover at the very least the region/
volume of the patient that is scheduled to undergo
MR imaging and, therefore, RF irradiation.
5. To help safeguard against thermal injuries or
burns, depending on specific magnet designs,
care may be needed to ensure that the patient’s
tissue(s) do not directly come into contact with
the inner bore of the MR imager during the MRI
process. This is especially important for several
higher field MR scanners. The manufacturers of
these devices provide pads and other such insu-
lating devices for this purpose, and manufacturer
guidelines should be strictly adhered to for these
units.
6. It is important to ensure the patient’s tissues do
not form large conductive loops. Therefore, care
should be taken to ensure that the patient’s arms
or legs are not positioned in such a way as to
form a large caliber loop within the bore of the
MR imager during the imaging process. For this
reason, it is preferable that patients be instructed
not to cross their arms or legs in the MR scanner.
We are also aware of unpublished reports of ther-
mal injury that seem to have been associated with
skin-to-skin contact such as in the region of the
inner thighs. It might be prudent to consider
ensuring that skin-to-skin contact instances are
minimized or eliminated in or near the regions
undergoing radiofrequency energy irradiation.
7. Skin staples and superficial metallic sutures:
Patients requested to undergo MR studies in
whom there are skin staples or superficial metal-
lic sutures (SMS) may be permitted to undergo
the MR examination if the skin staples or SMS
are not ferromagnetic and are not in or near the
anatomic volume of RF power deposition for the
study to be performed. If the nonferromagnetic
skin staples or SMS are within the volume to be
RF irradiated for the requested MR study, several
precautions are recommended.
a. Warn the patient and make sure that they are
especially aware of the possibility that they
may experience warmth or even burning along
the skin staple or SMS distribution. The
patient should be instructed to report immedi-
ately if they experience warmth or burning
sensations during the study (and not, for
example, wait until the ‘‘end of the knocking
noise’’).
b. It is recommended that a cold compress or ice
pack be placed along the skin staples or SMS if
this can be safely clinically accomplished dur-
ing the MRI examination. This will help to serve
as a heat sink for any focal power deposition
that may occur, thus decreasing the likelihood
of a clinically significant thermal injury or burn
to adjacent tissue.
8. For patients with extensive or dark tattoos,
including tattooed eyeliner, to decrease the poten-
tial for RF heating of the tattooed tissue, it is rec-
ommended that cold compresses or ice packs be
placed on the tattooed areas and kept in place
throughout the MRI process if these tattoos are
within the volume in which the body coil is being
used for RF transmission. This approach is
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especially appropriate if fast spin echo (or other
high RF duty cycle) MRI sequences are antici-
pated in the study. If another coil is being used
for RF transmission, a decision must be made if
high RF transmitted power is to be anticipated by
the study protocol design. If so, then the above
precautions should be followed. Additionally,
patients with tattoos that had been placed within
48 h before the pending MR examination should
be advised of the potential for smearing or smudg-
ing of the edges of the freshly placed tattoo.
9. The unconscious or unresponsive patient should
have all attached leads covered with a cold com-
press or ice pack at the lead attachment site for
the duration of the MR study.
10. As noted above, it has been demonstrated that
resonant circuitry can be established during MRI
between the RF energies being transmitted and
specific lengths of long electrically conductive
wires or leads, which can thus act as efficient
antennae. This can result in heating of the tips of
these wires or leads to temperatures in excess of
90 C in a few seconds. Therefore, patients in
whom there are long electrically conductive leads,
such as Swan-Ganz thermodilution cardiac out-
put capable catheters or Foley catheters with elec-
trically conductive leads as well as electrically
active implants containing leads such as pace-
makers, ICDs, neurostimulators, and cochlear
implants, let alone electrically active implant such
as pacemakers,, should be considered at risk for
MR studies if the body coil is to be used for RF
transmission over the region of the electrically
conductive lead, even if only part of the lead path-
way is within the volume to undergo RF irradia-
tion. This is especially true for higher-field
systems (e.g., greater than 0.5 T) and for imaging
protocols using fast spin echo or other high-RF
duty cycle MRI sequences. Each such patient
should be reviewed and cleared by an attending
level 2 radiologist and a risk benefit ratio assess-
ment performed before permitting them access to
the MR scanner.
11. The potential to establish substantial heating is
itself dependent upon multiple factors, including,
among others, the static magnetic field strength of
the MR scanner (as this determines the transmit-
ted radiofrequencies (RF) at which the device oper-
ates) and the length, orientation, and inductance
of the electrical conductor in the RF irradiated
volume being studied. Virtually any lead lengths
can produce substantial heating. Innumerable fac-
tors can affect the potential for tissue heating for
any given lead. It is therefore critical to recognize
that of all electrically conductive implants, it is
specifically wires, or leads, that pose the greatest
potential hazard for establishing substantial
power deposition/heating considerations.
Another important consideration is that as a direct
result of the above, it has already been demon-
strated in vitro that heating of certain implants or
wires may be clinically insignificant at, for example,
1.5 Tesla but quite significant at 3.0 Tesla. How-
ever, it has also been demonstrated that specific
implants might demonstrate no significant thermal
issues or heating at 3.0 Tesla, but may heat to clini-
cally significant or very significant levels in seconds
at, for example, 1.5 Tesla. Thus, it is important to
follow established product MR Conditional labeling
and safety guidelines carefully and precisely, apply-
ing them to and only to the static magnetic field
strengths at which they had been tested. MR scan-
ning at either stronger and/or weaker magnetic
field strengths than those tested may result in sig-
nificant heating where none had been observed at
the tested field strength(s).
I. Drug Delivery Patches and Pads
Some drug delivery patches contain metallic foil.
Scanning the region of the metallic foil may result in
thermal injury (21). Because removal or repositioning
can result in altering of patient dose, consultation
with the patient’s prescribing physician would be indi-
cated in assessing how to best manage the patient. If
the metallic foil of the patch delivery system is
positioned on the patient so that it is in the volume of
excitation of the transmitting RF coil, the case should
be specifically reviewed with the radiologist or physi-
cian covering the case. Alternative options may
include placing an ice pack directly on the patch. This
solution may still substantially alter the rate of
delivery or absorption of the medication to the patient
(and be less comfortable to the patient, as well). This
ramification should therefore not be treated lightly,
and a decision to proceed in this manner should be
made by a knowledgeable radiologist attending
the patient and with the concurrence of the referring
physician as well.
If the patch is removed, a specific staff member
should be given responsibility for ensuring that it is
replaced or repositioned at the conclusion of the MR
examination.
J. Cryogen-Related Issues
1. For superconducting systems, in the event of a
system quench, it is imperative that all personnel
and patients be evacuated from the MR scan
room as quickly as safely feasible and the site
access be immediately restricted to all individu-
als until the arrival of MR equipment service
personnel. This is especially so if cryogenic gases
are observed to have vented partially or com-
pletely into the scan room, as evidenced in part
by the sudden appearance of white ‘‘clouds’’ or
‘‘fog’’ around or above the MR scanner. As noted
in section B.3.n above, it is especially important
to ensure that all police and fire response
personnel are restricted from entering the MR
scan room with their equipment (axes, air tanks,
guns, etc.) until it can be confirmed that the
magnetic field has been successfully dissipated,
as there may still be considerable static magnetic
field present despite a quench or partial quench
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of the magnet (22).
2. It should be pointed out that room oxygen moni-
toring was discussed by the MR Blue Ribbon
Panel and rejected at this time because the pres-
ent oxygen monitoring technology was considered
by industry experts not to be sufficiently reliable
to allow for continued operation during situa-
tions of power outages, etc.
K. Claustrophobia, Anxiety, Sedation, Analgesia
and Anesthesia
Adult and pediatric patient anxiolysis, sedation, anal-
gesia, and anesthesia for any reason should follow
established ACR (23), American Society of Anesthesi-
ologists (ASA) (15,24–26), and TJC standards (17).
L. Contrast Agent Safety
1. Contrast agent administration issues:
No patient is to be administered prescription MR
contrast agents without orders from a duly licensed
physician. Intravenous injection-qualified MR technol-
ogists may start and attend to peripheral IV access
lines if they have undergone the requisite site-speci-
fied training in peripheral IV access and have demon-
strated and documented appropriate proficiency in
this area. IV-qualified MR technologists may adminis-
ter FDA-approved gadolinium-based MR contrast
agents by means of peripheral IV routes as a bolus or
slow or continuous injection as directed by the orders
of a duly licensed site physician.
Administration of these agents is to be performed as
per the ACR policy. The ACR approves of the injection
of contrast material and diagnostic levels of radio-
pharmaceuticals by certified and/or licensed radio-
logic technologists and radiologic nurses under the
direction of a radiologist or his or her physician desig-
nee who is personally and immediately available, if
the practice is in compliance with institutional and
state regulations. There must also be prior written
approval by the medical director of the radiology
department/service of such individuals. Such ap-
proval process must follow established policies and
procedures, and the radiologic technologists and
nurses who have been so approved must maintain
documentation of continuing medical education
related to materials injected and to the procedures
being performed (27).
The name of the administered contrast agent, the
administered dose, and the route (and, if applicable,
rate) of administration as well as any adverse reac-
tions, if any, should be recorded for all contrast
agents administered as part of the executed MR
examination.
2. Prior Contrast Agent Reaction Issues:
a. According to the ACR Manual on Contrast Media
(28) adverse events after intravenous injection of
gadolinium seem to be more common in patients
who had previous reactions to an MR contrast
agent. In one study, 16 (21%) of 75 patients who
had previous adverse reactions to MR contrast
agents reacted to subsequent injections of gado-
linium. Patients with asthma also seem to be
more likely to have an adverse reaction to admin-
istration of a gadolinium-based MR contrast
agent. Patients with allergies also seemed to be at
increased risk (2.0–3.7 times, compared with
patients without allergies). Patients who have had
adverse reactions to iodinated contrast media are
more than twice as likely to have an adverse reac-
tion to gadolinium (6.3% of 857 patients).
b. At present, there are no well-defined policies
for patients who are considered to be at
increased risk for having adverse reaction to
MR contrast agents. However, the following
recommendations are suggested: patients who
have previously reacted to one MR contrast
agent can be injected with another agent if they
are restudied, and at-risk patients can be pre-
medicated with corticosteroids and, occasion-
ally, antihistamines.
c. All patients with asthma, allergic respiratory
histories, prior iodinated or gadolinium-based
contrast reactions, etc. should be followed more
closely as they are at a demonstrably higher risk
of adverse reaction.
3. Severe Renal Disease, Gadolinium-Based MR
Contrast Agents, and Nephrogenic Fibrosing
Dermopathy/Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis
(NFD/NSF)
Since the prior version of this document the ACR
decided that MR safety issues related to gadolinium
based contrast agents (GBCA) and NSF would be the
purview of the ACR Committee on Drugs and Contrast
Media. For the recommendations of the ACR Commit-
tee on Drugs and Contrast Media regarding GBCA
and NSF, the reader is referred to the most recent
publication of that committee in this regard which
appears in the ACR Manual on Contrast Media, Ver-
sion 8, Chapter 13, Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis.
The most recent version of the ACR Manual on Con-
trast Media may be downloaded from the American
College of Radiology website at http://www.acr.org/
Quality-Safety/Resources.
M. Patients in Whom There Are or May Be
Intracranial Aneurysm Clips
1. In the event that it is unclear whether a patient
does or does not have an aneurysm clip in place,
plain films should be obtained. Alternatively, if
available, any cranial plain films, CT or MR
examination that may have taken in the recent
past (i.e., subsequent to the suspected surgical
date) should be reviewed to assess for a possible
intracranial aneurysm clip.
2. In the event that a patient is identified to have an
intracranial aneurysm clip in place, the MR ex-
amination should not be performed until it can
be documented that the specific manufacturer,
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model, and type of aneurysm clip within that
patient is MR Safe or MR Conditional. All
documentation of types of implanted clips, dates,
etc. must be in writing and signed by a licensed
physician. Phone or verbal histories and histories
provided by a nonphysician are not acceptable.
Fax copies of operative reports, physician state-
ments, etc. are acceptable as long as a legible
physician signature accompanies the requisite
documentation. A written history of the clip itself
having been appropriately tested for ferromag-
netic properties (and description of the testing
methodology used) before implantation by the
operating surgeon is also considered acceptable
if the testing follows the standard test methods
established by ASTM International.
3. All intracranial aneurysm clips manufactured
1995 or later for which the manufacturer’s prod-
uct labeling continues to claim MR Conditional
labeling may be accepted for MR scanning with-
out further testing.
4. Clips manufactured before 1995 require either
pretesting (as per the ASTM F2503 standard
practice guidelines) before implantation or indi-
vidual review of previous MRI of the clip or brain
in that particular case, if available. By assessing
the size of the artifact associated with the clip
relative to the static field strength on which it
was studied, the sequence type, and the MRI
parameters selected, an opinion may be issued
by one of the site’s level 2 MR attending radiolog-
ists as to whether the clip demonstrates signifi-
cant ferromagnetic properties or not. Access to
the MR scanner would then be based on that
opinion.
5. A patient with an aneurysm clip (or other
implant) may have safely undergone a prior MR
examination at any given static magnetic field
strength. This fact in and of itself is not sufficient
evidence of the implant’s MR safety and should
not solely be relied upon to determine the MR
safety or compatibility status of that aneurysm
clip (or other implant).
Variations in static magnetic field strength, static
magnetic field spatial gradient, orientation of the
aneurysm clip (or other implant) to the static
magnetic field or static field gradient, rate of
motion through the spatial static field gradient,
etc. are all variables that are virtually impossible
to control or reproduce. These variables may not
have resulted in adverse event in one circum-
stance but may result in significant injury or
death on a subsequent exposure. For example, a
patient who went blind from interactions between
the metallic foreign body in his retina and the
spatial static fields of the MR scanner entered
the magnet and underwent the entire MR exami-
nation without difficulty; he only went blind
upon exiting the MR scanner at the completion of
the examination.
6. Barring availability of either pretesting or prior
MRI data of the clip in question, a risk–benefit
assessment and review must be performed in
each case individually. Furthermore, for
patients with intracranial clips with no available
ferromagnetic or imaging data, should the risk–
benefit ratio favor the performance of the MR
study, the patient or guardian should provide
written informed consent that includes death as
a potential risk of the MRI procedure before per-
mitting that patient to undergo an MR
examination.
N. Patients in Whom There are or May Be
Cardiac Pacemakers or Implantable
Cardioverter Defibrillators
MRI of Cardiac Implantable Devices
Background: Cardiac implantable electronic devices
(CIEDs) have expanded in number and complexity
since their introduction in 1958 and now include car-
diac pacemakers, implantable cardioverter-defibrilla-
tors (ICD), implantable cardiovascular monitors (ICM)
and implantable loop recorders (ILR). Pacemakers
(pulse generators) and leads that are FDA labeled MR
conditional became available in the U.S., February of
2011 and both commercially available ILRs are
labeled also ‘‘MR Conditional’’ The vast majority of
CIEDs, however, are not labeled as MR Conditional.
No ICDs are currently labeled ‘‘MR Conditional’’ and
none are expected to be clinically available for several
years. Patient product wallet identification cards,
industry maintained databases, plain film lead and
pulse generator X-ray identifiers, and operative notes
may assist in identification of MR Conditional patient
hardware.
Radiologists and cardiovascular specialists must be
familiar with restrictions for each device, recognizing
that because each MR conditional device is unique,
there are no ‘‘universal’’ labeling guidelines that are
applicable for all. Failure to follow the product label-
ing for a particular device is ‘‘off-label’’ and could
result in an adverse event.
Potential Complications: Unexpected programming
changes, inhibition of pacemaker output, failure to
pace, transient asynchronous pacing, rapid cardiac
pacing, the induction of ventricular fibrillation, heat-
ing of the tissue adjacent to the pacing or ICD system
and especially cardiac tissue near the lead tip, early
battery depletion, and outright device failure requiring
replacement may occur during MRI of patients with
pacemakers or ICDs (18,29–31). Multiple deaths have
been documented to occur under poorly and incom-
pletely characterized circumstances when CIED
patients underwent MRI (32–34). These deaths may
have occurred as a result of pacemaker inhibition,
failure to capture or device failure (resulting in pro-
longed asystole) and or rapid cardiac pacing or asyn-
chronous pacing (resulting in the initiation of ventric-
ular tachycardia or fibrillation).
Patient Assessment: Most CIEDs can be viewed as
having a pacing or defibrillator ‘‘system’’ comprised of
a pulse generator and one or more leads. Current
insertable loop recorders are leadless and are for
monitoring (not therapeutic) purposes alone.
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Importantly, leads and occasionally pulse generators
may have been ‘‘abandoned’’ in the patient from previ-
ous implants. As such, each patient may have a ‘‘sys-
tem’’ that includes both active and inactive (aban-
doned) hardware. While electrically and
therapeutically inactive with regard to pacing func-
tionality outside the MR suite, abandoned hardware
may pose a substantial risk if exposed to MRI energies
irrespective of the MR compatibility of the active pac-
ing hardware (35). Indeed, abandoned leads may well
pose a greater relative risk of lead tip heating if
exposed to the MR imaging process than leads that
are part of an actively implanted system.
The experience with MR imaging in patients who
have retained metallic materials after cardiac surgery
such as epicardial pacing leads is perhaps helpful
(36). While some have produced survey data suggest-
ing that in the case of postoperatively retained cardiac
pacing wires, ‘‘the absence of reported complications
in thousands of exposed patients suggests that the
risk is low (37), others have voiced appropriate con-
cern as to the general relevance of this data to the
overall population (38).’’
Patient Assessment for MRI
All device hardware should be included in the practi-
tioner’s assessment of the patient’s suitability for MR
scanning. Coordination with the physician managing
the device (cardiologist/electrophysiologist) and a
representative from the device manufacturer is of
paramount importance to determine whether the
system (pulse generator and leads) is MR Condi-
tional. Practitioners and their staff should note that
the entire system (pulse generator and leads) must
be labeled ‘‘MR Conditional’’ for a system to in fact
be considered MR conditionally safe. Furthermore,
an MR Conditional system is only considered safe if
all of the MR conditions for safe use are followed.
The presence of abandoned leads from previous non-
labeled systems or ‘‘mix-and-match’’ systems (com-
bined MR Conditional labeled and nonlabeled hard-
ware) renders the system as a whole MR Unsafe or
at best ‘‘MR unknown’’. Importantly, because of the
potential for heating, an abandoned (unattached to a
pulse generator) MR Conditional lead should be con-
sidered, and from a risk assessment point of view,
treated as, MR Unsafe.
The patient’s attestations as to their device MR com-
patibility is not sufficient to establish MR safety. To
provide for the safest scanning experience, to mini-
mize confusion and disappointment, to prevent delays
in diagnosis due to rescheduling, and to limit the
potential for throughput disruption in an already
busy MR schedule, we recommend the development of
institutional policies, protocols and care pathways for
all patients with implantable rhythm devices irrespec-
tive of their labeling. Careful, thoughtful advance
planning and close collaboration between the radiol-
ogy and cardiology staffs and the industry representa-
tives of the device manufacturers will provide the
greatest likelihood for a consistent, safe experience.
Unlabeled Cardiac Devices: Amongst the patients
with MR unsafe CIEDs, many have conditions that
would ordinarily be assessed with MRI. While many
can have their medical conditions managed without
MRI, in some instances, specific clinical circumstan-
ces may present compelling reasons for undergoing
an MR examination (39). Should MRI be considered, it
should be evaluated on a case-by-case and site-by-
site basis and only if the site is manned with individu-
als with the appropriate radiology and cardiology
knowledge and expertise on hand.
The committee eschews the term ‘‘modern’’ when
referring to a particular device, recognizing that all
devices not labeled for use in the MRI contain legacy
components and designs that may not be resistant to
the forces and electromagnetic interference present in
the MRI suite. All devices, unless appropriately tested
and labeled, should never be regarded as safe for
MRI simply because they are ‘‘modern’’ or recently
manufactured.
Consent: The patient with a pacemaker or ICD that
is not labeled as MR Conditional should be apprised
of the risks associated with MRI and should provide
informed consent. While the majority of reported
deliberate scans of device patients have proceeded
without adverse effects when appropriate precau-
tions were undertaken, several have not, and there
is under-reporting of adverse events, including
deaths. Thus, assignment of a risk benefit ratio to
the performance of MRI in any given device patient
is difficult. While the risk may be low, patients with
devices that are not labeled as MR Conditional
should be advised that life-threatening arrhythmias
might occur during MRI and serious device malfunc-
tion might occur requiring replacement of the device.
Precautions during MRI with CIEDs: Should any MRI
examination be contemplated for a patient with an
implanted pacemaker or ICD, it is recommended that
radiology and cardiology personnel and a fully stocked
crash cart be readily available throughout the proce-
dure in case a significant arrhythmia develops during
the examination that does not terminate with the
cessation of the MR study. The cardiologist should be
familiar with the patient’s arrhythmia history and the
implanted device. A programmer that can be used to
adjust the device should be readily available. The goal
of pre-MRI programming should be to mitigate the
risk to the patient and the device while undergoing
MRI (40,41). All such patients should be actively
monitored throughout the examination. A central
monitoring facility located in the hospital with appro-
priately trained staff may be sufficient to monitor
appropriately selected low risk device patients under-
going MR scanning.
At a minimum, EKG and pulse oximetry should be
used for monitoring these patients. At the conclusion
of the examination, the device should be interrogated
to confirm that the function is consistent with
the pre-examination state. In the absence of detected
post MR anomalies, the value of repeating device
re-evaluation is controversial. However, the clinician
may recommend a post-scan follow-up check of the
patient’s device (1–6 weeks) following the scan to
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confirm appropriate function. For appropriately
selected patients who have no post-MRI device abnor-
malities demonstrated, remote follow-up through
home monitoring seems appropriate. There is no com-
pelling evidence that post MRI defibrillation threshold
testing is required if the MR-exposed ICD shows no
post MRI anomalies (42).
Should an MRI (or entry into the magnet area) be
performed inadvertently on a patient with a pace-
maker or ICD, the patient’s cardiologist should be
contacted before the patient’s discharge from the MRI
suite. Exposure to the static magnetic field alone may
adversely affect device function or alter its program-
ming (43–45). The importance of interrogation of the





Patients, visitors or facility staff who do not meet the
criteria of level 1 or level 2 MR personnel will be
referred to as non-MR personnel. Specifically, non-MR
personnel will be the terminology used to refer to any
individual or group who has not within the previous
12 months undergone the designated formal training
in MR safety issues defined by the MR safety director
of that installation.
Level 1 MR Personnel
Individuals who have passed minimal safety educa-
tional efforts to ensure their own safety as they work
within Zone III will be referred to as level 1 MR per-
sonnel (e.g., MRI department office staff, and patient
aides.)
Level 2 MR Personnel
Individuals who have been more extensively trained
and educated in the broader aspects of MR safety
issues, including, issues related to the potential for
thermal loading or burns and direct neuromuscular
excitation from rapidly changing gradients, will be
referred to as level 2 MR personnel (e.g., MRI technol-




This region includes all areas that are freely accessi-
ble to the general public. This area is typically outside
the MR environment itself and is the area through
which patients, health care personnel, and other
employees of the MR site access the MR environment.
Zone II
This area is the interface between the publicly acces-
sible uncontrolled Zone I and the strictly controlled
Zone III (see below). Typically, the patients are greeted
in Zone II and are not free to move throughout Zone II
at will, but rather are under the supervision of MR
personnel. It is in Zone II that the answers to MR
screening questions, patient histories, medical insur-
ance questions, etc. are typically obtained.
Zone III
This area is the region in which free access by
unscreened non-MR personnel or ferromagnetic
objects or equipment can result in serious injury or
death as a result of interactions between the individu-
als or equipment and the MR scanner’s particular envi-
ronment. These interactions include, but are not
limited to, those with the MR scanner’s static and time
varying magnetic fields. All access to Zone III is to be
strictly physically restricted, with access to regions
within it (including Zone IV; see below) controlled by,
and entirely under the supervision of, MR personnel.
Zone IV
This area is synonymous with the MR scanner magnet
room itself. Zone IV, by definition, will always be
located within Zone III as it is the MR magnet and its
associated magnetic field which generates the exis-
tence of Zone III.
Non-MR Personnel should be accompanied by, or
under the immediate supervision of and visual con-
tact with, one specifically identified level 2 MR person
for the entirety of their duration within Zone III or IV
restricted regions.
Level 1 and 2 MR personnel may move freely about
all zones.
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APPENDIX 2
Safety Screening Form for Magnetic Resonance (MR) Procedures
Date________ Name (first middle last)_________________________________________________________________________
Female [ ] Male [ ] Age_____ Date of Birth________ Height_______ Weight______
Why are you having this examination (medical problem)?___________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
YES NO
Have you ever had an MRI examination before and had a problem? _____ _____
If yes, please describe_____________________________________________________________________________________
Have you ever had a surgical operation or procedure of any kind? _____ _____
If yes, list all prior surgeries and approximate dates: _______________________________________________________
Have you ever been injured by a metal object or foreign body (e.g., bullet, BB shrapnel)? _____ _____
If yes, please describe_____________________________________________________________________________________
Have you ever had an injury from a metal object in your eye (metal slivers, _____ _____
metal shavings, other metal object)?
If yes, did you seek medical attention? _____ _____
If yes, describe what was found__________________________________________________________
Do you have a history of kidney disease, asthma, or other allergic respiratory disease? _____ _____
Do you have any drug allergies? _____ _____
If yes, please list drugs____________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Have you ever received a contrast agent or X-ray dye used for MRI, CT,
or other X-ray or study? _____ _____
Have you ever had an X-ray dye or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
contrast agent allergic reaction? _____ _____
If yes, please describe_____________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Are you pregnant or suspect you may be pregnant? _____ _____
Are you breast feeding? _____ _____
Date of last menstrual period______ Post-menopausal? _____ _____
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MR Hazard Checklist
Please mark on the drawings provided the location of any metal inside your body or site of surgical
operation.
The following items may be harmful to you during your MR scan or may interfere with the MR examination.
You must provide a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ for every item. Please indicate if you have or have had any of the following:
YES NO
____ ____ Any type of electronic, mechanical, or magnetic implant
Type_________________
____ ____ Cardiac pacemaker
____ ____ Aneurysm clip




____ ____ Any type of internal electrodes or wires
____ ____ Cochlear implant
____ ____ Hearing aid
____ ____ Implanted drug pump (e.g., insulin, Baclofen, chemotherapy, pain medicine)
____ ____ Halo vest
____ ____ Spinal fixation device
____ ____ Spinal fusion procedure
____ ____ Any type of coil, filter, or stent
Type__________________
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____ ____ Any type of metal object (e.g., shrapnel, bullet, BB)
____ ____ Artificial heart valve
____ ____ Any type of ear implant
____ ____ Penile implant
____ ____ Artificial eye
____ ____ Eyelid spring
____ ____ Any type of implant held in place by a magnet
Type___________________
____ ____ Any type of surgical clip or staple
____ ____ Any IV access port (e.g., Broviac, Port-a-Cath, Hickman, Picc line)
____ ____ Medication patch (e.g., Nitroglycerine, nicotine)
____ ____ Shunt
____ ____ Artificial limb or joint
What and where______________
____ ____ Tissue Expander (e.g., breast)
____ ____ Removable dentures, false teeth or partial plate
____ ____ Diaphragm, IUD, Pessary
Type________________________
____ ____ Surgical mesh
Location_____________________
____ ____ Body piercing
Location_____________________
____ ____ Wig, hair implants
____ ____ Tattoos or tattooed eyeliner
____ ____ Radiation seeds (e.g., cancer treatment)
____ ____ Any implanted items (e.g., pins, rods, screws, nails, plates, wires)
____ ____ Any hair accessories (e.g., bobby pins, barrettes, clips)
____ ____ Jewelry
____ ____ Any other type of implanted item
Type_____________________
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Instructions for the Patients
1. You are urged to use the ear plugs or headphones that we supply for use during your MRI examination
because some patients may find the noise levels unacceptable, and the noise levels may affect your
hearing.
2. Remove all jewelry (e.g., necklaces, pins, rings).
3. Remove all hair pins, bobby pins, barrettes, clips, etc.
4. Remove all dentures, false teeth, partial dental plates.
5. Remove hearing aids.
6. Remove eyeglasses.
7. Remove your watch, pager, cell phone, credit and bank cards and all other cards with a magnetic strip.
8. Remove body piercing objects.
9. Use gown, if provided, or remove all clothing with metal fasteners, zippers, etc.
I attest that the above information is correct to the best of my knowledge. I have read and understand the




Print name of MD, RN, RT__________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
For MRI Office Use Only
Patient Name________________________________________
Patient ID Number__________________________________ Referring Physician_______________________
Procedure__________________________________________ Diagnosis_______________________
Clinical History_____________________________________
Hazard Checklist for MRI Personnel
YES NO
____ ____ Endotracheal tube
____ ____ Swan-Ganz catheter
____ ____ Extra ventricular device
____ ____ Arterial line transducer
____ ____ Foley catheter with temperature sensor and/or metal clamp
____ ____ Rectal probe
____ ____ Esophageal Probe
____ ____ Tracheotomy tube
____ ____ Guidewires
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APPENDIX 3
MR Facility Safety Design Guidelines
The goal of MR safety is to prevent harm to patients,
though a MR facility cannot simply adopt one or two
interventions and hope to successfully attain this
objective. According to safety and human factors engi-
neering principles, multiple safety strategies must be
adopted to be effective. This approach is sometimes
termed ‘‘defense in depth.’’ The safety strategies out-
lined in the main body of this MR Safe Practice Guide-
lines document include, for instance, policies that
restrict personnel access, specialized training and
drills for MR personnel, and warning labels for devi-
ces to be brought into Zone IV regions.
Along with these people-oriented strategies of poli-
cies and training, organizations need also to adopt the
strategies of safety-oriented architectural and interior
design. These design elements can support the other
safety strategies, by making them easier or more
obvious to follow. The architectural enhancements
described herein add one or more strong barriers to
enhance ‘‘defense in depth’’.
This appendix includes descriptions of architectural
and interior design recommendations organized
around the many MR suite functional areas. Note that
a facility’s design can encourage safety and best prac-
tices by improving the flow of patients, various health-
care personnel, and equipment and devices, and not
just by to preventing MR unsafe items from becoming
missiles, or screening out patients with hazardous
implanted devices.
Placing design elements strategically in a suite lay-
out such that the element supports best practice
workflow patterns will increase compliance with safer
practices. For example, having a private area for
patient screening interviews will make it more likely
the patients will disclose sensitive types of implants.
Another example of designing for safety is to include
dedicated space and temporary storage for MR Unsafe
equipment (e.g., ferromagnetic IV poles, transport
stretchers) out of direct sight and away from people
flow patterns.
Effective and safe MRI suites must balance the
technical demands of the MR equipment with local
and state building codes, standards of accrediting
bodies, clinical and patient population needs, payor
requirements and a collage of civil requirements from
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
In an effort to better match appropriate facility
design guidelines with levels of patient acuity and
care, the ACR MR Safety Committee is currently
developing level designations for MRI facilities in con-
junction with the efforts of Committees from other
Societies and Organizations. These will address cus-
tomization of requirements for sites with varying
anticipated patient care sedation, anesthesia, and/or
interventional activities.
While it would be desirable to provide a universal
MRI suite safety design, the variables are too numer-
ous to adequately address in a single template. The
following MRI Facility Safety Design Guidelines are
provided to provide information in support of plan-
ning, design and construction of MR facilities, includ-
ing updates to existing MR facilities, which enhance
the safety of patients, visitors and staff. This informa-
tion is intended to supplement and expand upon
patient safety guidance provided throughout the ACR
MR Safe Practice Guidelines document.
1. MR Equipment Vendor Templates
Design templates provided by MR equipment manu-
facturers are invaluable in developing suites that
meet the minimum technical siting requirements for
the specific equipment. Vendor design templates,
however, typically depict only the control and equip-
ment rooms, in addition to the magnet room, Zone IV.
Patient/family waiting, interview areas, physical
screening/changing areas, access controls, storage,
crash carts, induction, medical gas services,
postscreened patient holding areas, infection control
provisions, and interventional applications, among
many other issues, are not addressed in typical ven-
dor provided drawings. These issues are left to facility
owners, operators and their design professionals to
resolve. The guidance which follows is designed to
address many of these issues which directly impact
safety within the MR suite.
2. Patient interview/clinical screening areas (Zone II)
Reviewing the patient Safety Screening Form and MR
Hazard Checklist requires discussing confidential per-
sonal information. To facilitate full and complete
patient disclosure of their medical history, this clini-
cal screening should be conducted in an area which
provides auditory and visual privacy for the patient.
Facilities should prospectively plan for electronic
patient medical records, which are useful in clinical
screening, and should provide for access to records in
the MR suite in support of clinical patient screening.
Clinical screening of inpatients may be completed in
the patient room for hospital-based MR facilities.
However, all screenings are to be double-checked and
verified by appropriately trained MR Personnel before
MR examination.
3. Physical screening and patient changing/gowning
rooms (Zone II)
All persons and objects entering Zone III should be
physically screened for the presence of ferromagnetic
materials which, irrespective of size, can become
threats in proximity to the MR. A location should be
provided for patients in which they may change out of
their street clothes and into a facility provided gown
or scrubs, if/as deemed appropriate. For those facili-
ties which either do not provide space for, or do not
require, patient changing, the facility must provide al-
ternative means of identifying and removing items
which the patient may have brought with them that
might pose threats in the MR environment.
A high-strength hand-held magnet is a recom-
mended tool to evaluate the gross magnetic character-
istics of objects of unknown composition. Magnetic
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strength for these permanent magnets fall off quickly
as one moves away from the face of the magnet. Thus,
these may not demonstrate attraction for ferromag-
netic components which are not superficially located
or cannot for whatever reason be brought into close
proximity with the surface of this hand-held magnet.
Ferromagnetic detection systems have been demon-
strated to be highly effective as a quality assurance
tool, verifying the successful screen and identifying
ferromagnetic objects which were not discovered by
conventional screening methods. It is recommended
that new facility construction anticipate the use of
ferromagnetic detection screening in Zone II and pro-
vide for installation of the devices in a location which
facilitates use and throughput. Many current ferro-
magnetic detection devices are capable of being posi-
tioned within Zone III, even at the door to the magnet
room, however a recommended use of ferromagnetic
detection is to verify the screening of patients before
passing through the controlled point of access into
Zone III.
Physical screening of patients should consist of re-
moval of all jewelry, metallic/ferromagnetic objects,
onplants and prostheses (as indicated by manufac-
turer’s conditional use requirements and physician
instructions), and either having patients change out
of their street clothes into facility provided gowns/
scrubs or thorough screening of street clothes, includ-
ing identifying the contents of pockets and composi-
tion of metallic fibers, fasteners, and reinforcing.
While gowning maybe helpful, it is certainly not fool
proof in precluding a patient from entering with ferro-
magnetic material on them.
4. Transfer Area/Ferrous Quarantine Storage (Zone II)
Patients arriving with wheelchairs, walkers, portable
oxygen and other appliances that may be unsafe in
the MR environment should be provided by the facility
with appropriate MR safe or MR conditional applian-
ces. An area should be provided to transfer the
patient from unsafe appliances to ones appropriate to
the MR environment. Unsafe appliances brought by
the patient should be secured in a ‘ferrous quaran-
tine’ storage area, distinct from storage areas for MR
safe and MR conditional equipment and ideally locked
out of sight. Patient belongings should be retrieved
from the ‘ferrous quarantine’ only when discharging
the patient to whom the objects belong from the MR
suite.
5. Access control (Zone III/Zone IV)
Means of physically securing and restricting access to
Zone III from all adjacent areas must be provided. In-
dependent access into Zone III must be limited to only
appropriately trained MR personnel.
6. Patient Holding (Zone III)
Depending upon facility capacity and patient volume,
it may be advisable to provide a postscreened patient
holding area. Zone III holding areas should be
equipped and appointed to prevent patient exit and
subsequent re-entry. This will help prevent the inad-
vertent—or even intentional—introduction of un-
screened objects and personnel.
Many multi-modal radiology facilities combine
patient holding and/or induction areas for patients of
different modalities. This presents safety challenges
when, for example, patients scheduled to receive a CT
are held in a patient holding area shared by
postscreened MR patients. As CT patients would not
typically be screened for MR contraindications or fer-
rous materials, this poses risks to both the CT patient
with a contraindicated implant and to those in the
MRI zone IV should an unscreened individual inad-
vertently enter with a ferrous object or implant.
Unless all persons in patient holding areas used for
postscreened MR patients are screened for MRI, the
practice of shared patient holding areas between MR
and other modalities is discouraged. Ultimately it is
the responsibility of trained MR staff to verify the
screening of any co-mingled patient before permitting
them access to Zone III and Zone IV.
In all MR facilities, Zone III is required to be physi-
cally secured and access limited to only MR personnel
and successfully MR prescreened non-MR personnel
accompanied by MR personnel. Ideally, facilities
should be designed such that patients for other
modalities are not co-mingled with postscreened MR
patients.
7. Lines of Sight/Situational Awareness (Zone III)
Trained MR personnel are arguably the single greatest
safety resource of MR facilities. These individuals
should be afforded visual control over all persons
entering or exiting Zones III or IV. The technologist
seated at the MR operator console should therefore be
able to view not only the patient in the MR scanner
but also the approach and entrance into Zone IV. Line
of sight between the MR system operator console and
both the Zone IV entrance(s) and the patient within
the MR scanner are requirements of the 2010 edition
of Guidelines for Design and Construction of Health
Care Facilities (46). When practical, suites should
also be prospectively designed to provide a view from
the MR operator’s console to patient holding areas. If
this cannot be satisfactorily achieved by direct line of
sight, remote video viewing devices are an acceptable
substitute toward accomplishing this objective.
The technologist at the console should also be pro-
vided with a view to induction/recovery areas within
the MR suite, as applicable.
8. Emergency Resuscitation Equipment
(Zone II or Zone III)
Because of risks associated with contrast agents,
sedation, anesthesia, and even the frail health of
patients undergoing MR examinations, it is advised
that each facility have appropriate provisions for sta-
bilization and resuscitation of patients.
It is recommended that crash carts and emergency
resuscitation equipment be stored in a readily acces-
sible area within either Zone II or Zone III. This emer-
gency resuscitation equipment is to be appropriately
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labeled and also tested and verified as safe for usage
in the MR environment for the anticipated conditions
of usage.
MR facilities should maintain a supply of emergency
medications to treat adverse reactions to administered
contrast agents.
MR facilities providing care to patients who require
clinical support during the MR examination should
have emergency response equipment and personnel,
trained in MR safety issues as well as trained to
respond to anticipatable adverse events, readily avail-
able to respond to patient adverse events or distress
in the MR arena.
9. Fringe Magnetic Field Hazards (Zone III)
For many MR system installations, magnetic fringe
fields which project beyond the confines of the magnet
room superimpose potential hazards on spaces which
may be outside the MR suite, potentially on levels
above or below the MR site and perhaps even outside
the building. Facilities must identify all occupy-able
areas, including those outside the MR suite (including
rooftops, storage areas, mechanical closets, etc.)
which are exposed to potentially hazardous magnetic
fringe field strengths. Areas of potential hazard must
be clearly identified and access to these areas
restricted, just as they would be within the MR suite.
10. Cryogen Safety (Zone IV)
Liquid helium and liquid nitrogen represent the most
commonly used cryogens in MR environments. The
physical properties of these cryogenic liquids present
significant potential safety hazards. If exposed to
room air these cryogenic liquids will rapidly boil off
and expand into a gaseous state. This produces sev-
eral potential safety concerns, including:
• Asphyxiation potential as cryogenic gases replace
oxygenated air.
• Frostbite considerations at the exceedingly low
temperatures of these cryogenic liquids.
• Fire hazards can exist in the unlikely event of a
quench, especially if some of the cryogenic gases
escape into the magnet room/Zone IV
• Pressure considerations within Zone IV can rarely
exist in the unlikely event of a quench in which
some of the cryogenic gases escape into the mag-
net room/Zone IV.
a. Cryogen Fills. Though contemporary supercon-
ducting magnets require cryogen re-fills only infre-
quently, there is still almost always the need to
periodically bring hundreds of liters of liquid cryogen
to the magnet. It is because of the risks to persons
near the magnet and storage/transport dewars that
trans-fill operations should be undertaken with great
care and only by appropriately trained personnel.
• Dewars containing cryogenic liquids should never
be stored inside an MRI facility or indeed in any
enclosed facility unless it is in a facility specifi-
cally designed to obviate the associated pressure,
temperature, and asphyxiation risks.
• A cryogen transfill should never be attempted by
untrained personnel or even with any unneces-
sary personnel in attendance, including MR per-
sonnel staff and patients, within Zone IV.
• Cryogen transfills should only be performed with
appropriate precautions in place to prevent
against pressure entrapment and asphyxiation.
b. Magnet Room Cryogen Safety. For most MRI sys-
tems if the magnet quenches, the escaping cryogenic
gases are ducted outside the building to an unoccu-
pied discharge area. However, there have been docu-
mented failures of cryogen vent/quench pipe
assemblies which have led to considerable quantities
of cryogenic gases being inadvertently discharged into
the magnet room/Zone IV. The thermal expansion of
the cryogens, if released into the magnet room, can
positively pressurize the magnet room and entrap per-
sons inside until such time that the pressure is
equalized.
The following recommended MRI suite design and
construction elements reduce patient and staff risks
in the unlikely event of a quench in which the cryogen
vent pathway (quench pipe) ruptures or leaks into
Zone IV:
• All magnet rooms/Zone IV regions for supercon-
ducting magnets should be provided with an
emergency exhaust pathway. The emergency
exhaust grille is to be located in the ceiling oppo-
site the entrance to the magnet room (Zone IV)
door. At this location, when activated in the
unlikely event of a quench breach, the exhaust
fan is positioned to draw the vaporous cloud of
cryogenic gas away from the door exiting from the
magnet room.
• Many MR manufacturers are now requiring that
magnet rooms for superconducting magnets also
be provided with an additional form of passive
pressure relief/pressure equalization to minimize
the risks of positive-pressure entrapment. Designs
for passive pressure relief mechanisms should fol-
low design criteria similar to that of cryogen vent
pathway and active exhaust, including discharge
to a protected area as described in section 10.c
below.
Some MR facilities are constructed without open
waveguides or glass observation windows to Zone IV
regions. In these facilities the potential risks of
entrapment are even greater and may warrant an
additional degree of attention in this regard.
While it can provide a degree of redundancy, it
should be noted that, even with an exhaust fan,
designing the door to Zone IV to swing outward is not,
by itself, an appropriate means of pressure relief. In a
severe positive pressure situation unlatching an out-
ward-swinging door might permit the door to burst
open with tremendous pressure, potentially injuring
person(s) opening the door. If used as the only means
of pressure equalization, an outward-swinging door
may actually introduce new hazards to any staff per-
son attempting to open the door to a pressurized mag-
net room from the outside.
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Similarly, though it has proven effective in life-
threatening situations, breaking a control window
should not be advocated as a primary means of reliev-
ing/equalizing Zone IV pressure in a quench situa-
tion. It should be noted that the current construction
of many RF shielded observation windows is such
that it would make breaking the window very difficult,
further diminishing it as a viable means of timely
pressure relief.
Once provided with appropriate pressure equaliza-
tion and emergency exhaust, magnet room door swing
direction and design should be left to the discretion of
a facility and their design professionals.
c. Cryogen Vent Pathway. Obstructions, inappropri-
ate pipe materials, insufficient pipe caliber and/or
length, or faulty connections in the length of the cryo-
gen vent pathway can cause failure between the mag-
net and point of discharge. An evaluation of the
current cryogen vent piping/ducting assembly is rec-
ommended to help identify and correct potential
weaknesses that could potentially fail in a quench.
Facilities are advised to evaluate the design and
inspect the construction of their cryogen vent system.
Because minimum design requirements for some
cryogen vent systems have been revised by magnet
system vendors, facilities should obtain current
standards from the original equipment manufacturers
to use in evaluating their cryogen vent assembly and
not rely on original siting requirements.
Beyond the assessment of the current construction of
the cryogen vent system, it is prudent for MRI facilities:
• To inspect cryogen vent systems at least annually,
identifying stress/wear of pipe sections and
couplings, loose fittings and supports or signs of
condensation/water within the cryogen vent path-
way which may indicate a blockage.
• Following any quench of a superconducting mag-
net, to conduct a thorough inspection of cryogen
vent system, including pipe sections, fittings,
couplings, hangers and clamps, before returning
the magnet to service.
Because obstructions/occlusions of the cryogen
vent can increase the likelihood of rupture in a
quench event, facilities should ensure that:
• The discharge point has an appropriate weather-
head which prevents horizontal, wind-driven pre-
cipitation from entering, collecting, or freezing in
the quench exhaust pipe.
• The discharge point is high enough off of the roof
or ground surface that snow or debris cannot
enter or occlude the pipe.
• The discharge is covered by a material of suffi-
ciently small openings to prevent birds or other
animals from entering the quench pipe, while not
occluding cryogenic gaseous egress in a quench
situation.
Facilities that discover failings in any of these basic
protections of the cryogen discharge point should im-
mediately take additional steps to verify the patency
of the cryogen vent and provide the minimum current
discharge protections recommended by the original
equipment manufacturer.
To protect persons from cryogen exposure at the
point of discharge:
• At the point of cryogen discharge, a quench safety
exclusion zone with a minimum clear radius of 25
feet (8 meters) should be established and clearly
marked with surface warnings and signage.
• The quench safety exclusion zone should be
devoid of serviceable equipment, air intakes, oper-
able windows or unsecured doors that either
require servicing or offer a pathway for cryogenic
gasses to re-enter the building.
• Persons who must enter this quench safety exclu-
sion zone, including incidental maintenance per-
sonnel and contractors, should be permitted to do
so only after receiving specific instruction on
quench risks and response.
11. MR Conditional Devices (Zone IV)
The normal or safe operation of many medical devices
designed for use in the MR environment may be dis-
rupted by exposure to conditions exceeding the device’s
conditional rating threshold. It is advisable for MR facili-
ties to identify the allowable conditional rating for static
field and spatial gradient exposure for each MR Condi-
tional device which may be brought into Zones III and
IV. MR Conditional devices may be conditionally safe for
one specific field strength, but unsafe at higher or lower
field strength. For prospective installations it is recom-
mended that the location of critical isogauss line(s) be
identified for MR Conditional equipment and devices
used within the MR suite and delineated on the floor
and walls of the magnet room to aid in the positioning
and safe and effective operation of said equipment.
All MR facilities should evaluate all MR Conditional
patient monitoring, ventilators, medication pumps,
anesthesia machines, monitoring devices, biopsy and
other devices and equipment which may be brought
into the magnet room for magnetic field tolerances.
Facilities should consider providing physical indica-
tions of critical gauss lines in the construction of the
magnet room to promote the safe and effective use of
MR Conditional equipment, as appropriate.
12. Infection control (Zone IV)
Because of safety concerns regarding incidental per-
sonnel within the MR suite, restricting housekeeping
and cleaning personnel from Zone III and/or IV
regions may give rise to concerns regarding the clean-
liness of the MR suite. Magnet room finishes and con-
struction details should be designed to facilitate
cleaning by appropriately trained staff with nonmotor-
ized equipment. Additionally, as the numbers of MR-
guided procedures and interventional applications
grow, basic infection control protocols, such as seam-
less floorings, scrub-able surfaces and hand washing
stations should be considered.
13. Limits of applicability/recommended design
assistance
The facility design issues identified in this document
address only general safety design issues for MRI
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suites. There are a multitude of site-specific and mag-
net-specific operational and technical design consider-
ations relevant to MR facility design and construction
that are not addressed in these Guidelines. These
issues include, but are not limited to, patient acuity,
staff access, modality conflicts, vibration sensitivity,
throughput/efficiency, HIPAA considerations, magnetic
contamination, sound transmission, magnet shim tol-
erances, shielding design, moving metal interferences,
MR equipment upgrades, electromagnetic interference,
and many others.
In addition to incorporating the guidance from this
document, a facility would be well advised to seek
expert assistance in the planning and design of MRI
and multi-modal radiology suites.
APPENDIX 4
MR Facility Emergency Preparedness Guidelines
Healthcare facilities have a unique obligation to mini-
mize the disruption from disasters and hasten their
ability to restore critical patient care services when
interrupted.
Those charged with the operation of MRI facilities
have the added complexities of protecting not only the
staff and structure, but also the equipment which
may be extraordinarily sensitive to changes in its
environment, including vibration, power supply, and
water damage.
In the fall of 2005, many watched as hurricanes
Katrina and Rita devastated vast swathes of the
United States’ Gulf Coast. Those facilities which were
well prepared for the damage, loss of power, and other
failures of infrastructure fared far better than those
that that were not.
Even those not in the likely path of future Gulf hur-
ricanes may have to contend with earthquakes, torna-
does, fires, ice storms, snowstorms, or blackouts, at
some point. Particularly those involved in providing
patient care should look to how we will provide care
at the times when it is most widely and desperately
needed. We may find that the facilities, equipment
and infrastructure required to provide clinical care
have not been adequately protected.
1. Water Damage:
Whether from roof-failure, burst pipes, storm surge or
rising rivers, every facility has the potential for water
damage to equipment and facilities. Damages can
range from inconveniences cured by a couple of hours
with a wet-dry vacuum, to flooding of equipment elec-
tronics. It takes only a small quantity of water in con-
tact with an MRI scanner to incapacitate or destroy
the equipment.
To keep leaking roofs, burst pipes or other overhead
damage from dousing MRI equipment, it is recom-
mended that facilities prepare by covering gantries
and equipment with sturdy plastic, taped in place,
when water damage is an anticipated possibility. To
keep processors and gradient cabinets from becoming
swamped in a flood situation, electronics that can be
lifted up off the ground should be moved as far up off
of the floor as possible. RF shields, particularly the
floor assembly, may be significantly damaged and
need to be replaced in a flood situation if not designed
to protect against water damage.
During the 2005 hurricanes, many hospitals and
imaging facilities that had emergency generators to
help restore power discovered that their sites had gen-
erators, or other critical supplies, in basements or
other low-lying areas that were flooded. Facilities
should evaluate risks from water damage and assess
their preparations for failure of the building enclosure
as well as the potential for a flood situation.
2. Structural damage:
MRI presents a particular challenge with structural
failure. Though unlikely with current magnet systems,
vibrations from seismic events do have the potential
to initiate a quench of the magnet system. Structural
damage or motion may also damage the RF shield en-
closure, potentially degrading image quality until the
shield is repaired.
3. Power Outage:
Without electrical power to the vacuum pump / cold
head to keep the cryogen within a superconducting
MRI liquefied, the cryogen will begin to boil off at an
accelerated rate. Depending upon cryogen vent design
and boil off rate, the additional cryogenic gas dis-
charge may freeze solid any accumulated water in the
cryogen vent, occluding the pipe and increasing the
possibility for a cryogen vent breach in the event of a
quench.
At some point if power to the vacuum pump is not
restored, likely a couple days to perhaps a week after
power is lost, the magnet will spontaneously quench,
discharging most or all of its remaining cryogenic gas-
ses. This poses a safety risk to anyone near the dis-
charge and runs a small but finite risk of potentially
permanently damaging the magnet coils.
However, if power to the vacuum pump/cold head
and cryogen levels is restored before a quench, there
should be no long-term consequences to the magnet’s
operation from a power interruption.
Temporary electrical power may be provided either
through on-site or portable generators. Co-generation,
or generating one’s own electricity all the time, may
not be economically feasible for smaller or stand-
alone sites, but is increasingly appealing to hospitals
for several reasons, with emergency capacity being
only one.
4. Quench:
During the 2005 hurricanes, facilities, fearing exten-
sive damage to their MRI systems from water or pro-
tracted power outages, manually initiated pre-emptive
quenches. Under the best circumstances, a quench
subjects a magnet to a change of 500F thermal shock
within a few dozen seconds, which can cause major
physical damage. Rarely, it is possible for the venting
cryogenic gases to breach the quench tube and cause
significant damage to the magnet room and/or
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jeopardize the safety of those in the vicinity. At one
New Orleans area facility that elected to preemptively
quench its magnets, the quench tube reportedly failed
and the pressure from the expanding cryogen blew
out the control room radiofrequency window (personal
communication, Tobias Gilk, October 2005).
Because of the risks to personnel, equipment and
physical facilities, manual magnet quenches are to be
initiated only after careful consideration and prepara-
tion. In addition to following those specific recommen-
dations provided by the MRI manufacturer, a facility
should initiate a pre-emptive quench in nonemergent
situations only after verifying the function of emer-
gency exhaust systems, verifying or providing means
of pressure relief and a preliminary visual inspection
of the cryogen vent pipe as it leaves the MR unit to
check for signs of water or ice inside the pipe (includ-
ing water leaking from fittings or condensation form-
ing on vent pipe sections). If/when feasible, a
discussion with the device manufacturer regarding an
intentional controlled static magnetic field ramp-down
may be advisable.
5. Fire/Police:
Though very infrequent, MR suites have been the
scene of emergencies requiring fire and/or police
response. While it is highly likely that this will be the
first time many of the responders have been to an MR
suite, this should not be the first time that responding
organizations have been introduced to the safety
issues for MR. Sites are encouraged to invite police
and fire representatives to presentations on MR safety
and to provide them with facility tours.
6. Code:
In the event that a person within the MR suite should
require emergency medical attention, it is imperative
that those responding to a call for assistance are
aware of, and comply with, MR safety protocols. This
includes nurses, physicians, respiratory technicians,
paramedics, security, and others.
The impulse to respond immediately must be tem-
pered by an orderly and efficient process to minimize
risks to patients, staff and equipment. This requires
specialized training for code teams and, as with Fire/
Police responses, clear lines of authority for screen-
ing, access restrictions and quench authority. Full
resuscitation of patients within Zone IV is complicated
by the inability to accurately interpret electrocardio-
graphic data. Furthermore, this may place at risk of
injury all within the Zone IV from ferromagnetic
objects which may be on, within, or brought into Zone
IV by emergency response personnel responding to a
code if one is called in that area. Therefore, after ini-
tiating basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation (airway,
breathing, chest compressions), the patient should be
immediately moved out of Zone IV to a prospectively
designated location where the code can be run or
where the patient will remain until the arrival of
emergent response personnel.
It is strongly advised that all MR facilities perform
regular drills to rehearse and refine emergency
response protocols to protect patients, MR staff and
responders.
7. Prevention:
While it is the nature of emergencies to be surprises,
we can anticipate the types of incidents that have
higher likelihoods given our facilities, practices and
locations. Every facility can anticipate the potential
for flooding, fire and code situations. In addition to
these, many areas (California and coastal Alaska, for
example) can expect earthquakes. The central and
southern plains states of the U.S. can anticipate tor-
nados. Colder climates can expect massive snows or
ice storms.
State and federal offices of emergency preparedness
are dedicated to anticipating and preparing for the
specific threats to your region. These can serve as an
excellent resource regarding risks and strategies for
preparation.
Once a disaster has struck, it is important to assess
what the immediate needs of the community are and
to restore those critical patient care services first.
Damage to MRI equipment and facilities may not be
repaired as quickly. For gravely incapacitated facili-
ties, semi-trailer based MRI units may be the only
means of quickly restoring radiology capacity.
All healthcare facilities should have emergency pre-
paredness plans. The healthcare plans for MRI facili-
ties should specifically address the unique aspects of
MRI equipment. These plans should define who has
the authority to authorize nonemergent quenches,
procedures for emergency or backup power for vac-
uum pump/cold head, as well as instructions on how
to protect gantries and sensitive electronics. Facilities
should have the necessary supplies prepositioned and
checklists for preparatory and responsive actions.
Emergency preparedness plans should also include
information necessary for restoring clinical services,
including contacts for MRI system vendor, RF shield
vendor, cryogen contractor, MR suite architect and
construction contractor, local and state officials, and
affiliated hospital and professional organizations.
Below are a few questions that may facilitate the de-
velopment of an emergency preparedness plan specific
to the needs of a facility.
• What are the likely/possible natural disasters to
affect the area?
• What are the likely/possible man-made disasters
to affect the area?
• Is electrical power likely to be interrupted?
• Would other utilities (natural gas, telecommunica-
tions, etc.) likely be interrupted?
• What equipment would be inoperative during the
emergency?
• What equipment could be damaged by the
emergency?
• What equipment should be provided with critical
or backup power?
• If the utility service is not quickly restored, what
other risks may arise?
• Would patients and staff be able to get to the
facility?
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• Would patients or staff be trapped at the facility?
• How critical is each patient care service provided
at the facility?
• How does the facility protect the equipment
needed to support each service?
• How does the facility protect the patient data
(including such options as off site storage) from
each service?
• If the facility does not have the resources on site,
who can provide them?
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